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ABSTRACT
Orhan Aygun, Three Essays on Matching with Contracts, Major Professor: Prof.
Tayfun Sönmez
This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays. In all essays matching
with contracts is a key factor. The rst essay tries to explain e¤ects of choosing
primitives of the model and irrelevance of rejected contracts condition on some key
existence theorems and results in matching with contracts literature. The second
essay analyzes the properties of cumulative o¤er algorithm and presents an application
of matching with contracts. It studies the achievability of responsive choices under
a constrained setup. The last essay presents a new market design application of
program-student matching where a¢ rmative action policies are e¤ective.
The rst essay develops a hospital-doctor many-to-one matching with contracts
model. Doctor preferences over contracts are part of primitive of the model. The other
primitive of the model, our rst essay suggests, hospital choice functions on sets of
contracts. The rst essay shows that if choice functions of hospitals are primitives
of the model, then existence theorems used in many papers do not hold even when
they satisfy strongest conditions. As a remedy, we introduced Irrelevance of Rejected
Contracts (IRC) which guarantees stability if it is satised along with one substitutes
condition.
Next, we show the relation between IRC and law of aggregate demand (LAD)
conditions. Since LAD is satised by many application naturally, many models sat-
isfying LAD and the strongest substitutes conditions are immune to our criticism.
On the other hand, many of the new and exiting applications satisfy only weakened
substitutes condition. Therefore, assuming IRC explicitly does not only make their
proofs accurate and also close the gap between theory and application.
The second chapter studies properties of cumulative o¤er algorithm under
weakened substitutes condition. In this part we showed that in many-to-one matching
with contracts problems order of proposals of COA does not change the outcome,
under bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions. Also, bilateral substitutes and IRC
conditions make COA equivalent to generalized deferred acceptance algorithm which
produces the outcome in fewer steps.
This chapter also presents a new application area of matching with contracts.
We used cadet-branch matching problem in USMA. In this application our main
objective is, for a given branch, increasing cadet quality without giving up useful
properties of allocation mechanism, such as stability and strategy-proofness.
The third essay studies a college admission with a¢ rmative action problem.
With this application, for the rst time in the literature, we presented an a¢ rmative
action problem where students need to claim privilege if they want to be subject to
a¢ rmative action. We analyzed the current system and showed that current guideline
is unfair and causes incentive compatibility issues. Also we showed that it fails to
satisfy a¢ rmative action requirements described in a¢ rmative action law.
To solve these problems with the current system, we introduced a new choice
function which is fair, respects a¢ rmative action requirements and makes student
optimal stable allocation stable and incentive compatible when used in conjunction
with generalized deferred acceptance algorithm.
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CHAPTER 1.
MATCHING WITH CONTRACTS: THE CRITICAL ROLE
OF IRRELEVANCE OF REJECTED CONTRACTS
1.1 Introduction
Formulation and analysis of matching with contracts model (Hateld and Mil-
grom 2005) is widely considered as one of the most important developments of the
last twenty years in theory of matching markets.1 This powerful model embeds Gale
and Shapley (1962) two-sided matching model and Kelso and Crawford (1982) labor
market model ,2 among others, and it has given impetus to a urry of theoretical re-
search as well as to new practical applications of market design. Utilizing xed-point
techniques from lattice theory, Hateld and Milgrom (2005) analyze the set of stable
allocations in their rich framework. One of the main messages of their paper is that
the set of stable allocations is non-empty under a substitutes condition. The substi-
tutes condition that plays a key role in the analysis of Hateld and Milgrom (2005),
also induces a strong isomorphism between matching with contracts model and Kelso
and Crawford (1982) labor market model (Echenique 2012). This isomorphism is
considered to be a highly negative result since it reduces the scope of Hateld and
Milgrom (2005) to that of Kelso and Crawford (1982). Fortunately this restrictive
equivalencebetween the two models breaks under two weaker conditions, bilateral
substitutes and unilateral substitutes, introduced by Hateld and Kojima (2010). The
1See also Adachi (2000), Fleiner (2003), and Echenique and Oviedo (2004).
2Kelso and Crawford (1982) builds on Crawford and Knoer (1981).
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signicance of these weaker substitutes conditions was further increased when Sönmez
and Switzer (2011) - Sönmez (2011) introduced a brand new market design applica-
tion of matching with contracts, cadet-branch matching, which satises the unilateral
substitutes condition but not the substitutes condition.
In this paper we show that both Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld
and Kojima (2010) implicitly assume an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts
(IRC) condition throughout their analysis, and in the absence of IRC several of their
results, including the guaranteed existence of a stable allocation, fail to hold. The
implicit assumption of IRC is a result of choosing strict preferences as the primitive
of their model. Unlike these two theoretical papers, many applications of matching
with contracts do not assume strict preferences. That is the reason why choosing
strict preferences as the primitive of the model and analyzing the model using IRC
as an implicit assumption creates an ambiguity in results. There are two possible
remedies to resolve this ambiguity. Of the two remedies, the rst (and scientically
more sound) one results in the failure of many theorems in the absence of an addi-
tional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition, whereas the second remedy
eliminates the transparency of the results, reduces the scope of the model, and con-
tradicts authorsinterpretation of the role of the substitutes conditions. Fortunately
all results are restored when IRC is explicitly assumed under the rst remedy.
Since Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld and Kojima (2010) will likely
play an important role in further applications of market design, it is important to
remove the inconsistency in the model. Fortunately most market design applications
of matching with contracts, including the above described cadet-branch matching,
2
satisfy IRC, and as such they are shielded from our criticism.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets up the model. After
introducing the model, background denitions and assumptions, we dene stability
notion and present a counter example. Having the example in hand, the paper pro-
ceeds with a remedy with the IRC and relation with the LAD condition. Then we
analyze e¤ect of choosing strict hospital preferences as primitives on results in the
literature and on the scope of the model. It concludes with a brief discussion of the
ndings and provides the proofs for some of the results in the appendix part.
1.2 The Model
We mostly follow the notation of Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld
and Kojima (2010). Since the purpose of this paper is presenting the implications
of a major inconsistency in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld and Kojima
(2010), our presentation will also closely follow theirs.
There are nite sets D and H of doctors and hospitals, and a nite set X
of contracts. Each contract x 2 X is associated with one doctor xD 2 D and one
hospital xH 2 H. Given a set of contracts Y  X, let YD denote the set of doctors
who has contracts in Y . That is, YD = fd 2 Dj 9y 2 Y s.t. yD = dg. Each doctor
d 2 D can sign at most one contract and his null contract where he signs no contract is
denoted by ;d. A set of contracts X 0  X is an allocation if each doctor is associated
with at most one contract under X 0.
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For each doctor d 2 D, d is a strict preference relation on his contracts fx 2 Xj xD = dg [ f;dg. A contract is acceptable by doctor d if it is at least as
good as the null contract ;d, and unacceptable by doctor d if it is worse than the null
contract ;d. For each doctor d 2 D and a set of contracts Y  X, the chosen set
Cd(Y ) of doctor d is dened as
Cd(Y ) = maxd

fx 2 Y j xD = dg [ f;dg

:
For a given set of contracts Y  X, dene CD(Y ) =
S
d2D Cd(Y ).
Given a hospital h 2 H, dene Xh = fx 2 Xj xH = hg to be the set of its
non-empty contracts in X. Each hospital h 2 H can sign multiple contracts and has
preferences h on
n
Y  Xhj y; y0 2 Y and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
:
Unlike doctor preferences, hospital preferences are not assumed to be strict in Hateld
and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld and Kojima (2010). This point, which may initially
seem to be a detail, will prove to be very important. For any Y  X, the chosen
set Ch(Y ) of hospital h is dened in Hateld and Kojima (2010) as
Ch(Y ) = maxh
n
Y 0  Y \Xhj y; y0 2 Y 0 and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
:
Observe that the above denition of Ch(Y )may include more than one set of contracts
unless hospital preferences are also assumed to be strict. Since choice sets are assumed
to be singletons throughout the analysis in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Hateld
and Kojima (2010), this denition is not well-dened. There are two possible remedies
for this inconsistency. Either hospital preferences shall be assumed to be strict (as in
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the case of the doctors), or Ch(Y ) shall be given as a selection from
max
h
n
Y 0  Y \Xhj y; y0 2 Y 0 and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
:
As it turns out, each remedy introduces its own complications to the analysis of
matching with contracts models. However, we will argue that the complications
associated with the latter are considerably easier to resolve, and as such, we will for
now allow indi¤erences in hospital preferences and assume that
Ch(Y ) 2 maxh
n
Y 0  Y \Xhj y; y0 2 Y 0 and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
:
For a given hospital h 2 H, we refer the function that maps each set of contracts to
a chosen set as the choice function of hospital h. For a given set of contracts Y  X,
dene CH(Y ) =
S
h2H Ch(Y ).
An important advantage of this modeling choice is that, it introduces no a
priori constraints on the structure of chosen sets. That is because, the preference re-
lation where a hospital h is indi¤erent between all subsets of Xh is consistent with any
selection of chosen sets. Thereby this modeling choice is equivalent to considering hos-
pital choice functions to be primitives of the model. In contrast, if one adopts the rst
remedy assuming hospitals have strict preferences, that would introduce constraints
on the structure of hospital choice functions including but not limited to a version
of the strong axiom of revealed preference, and as such, the entire analysis would be
superimposed on the implied structure, inconsistent with the authorsinterpretation
of the results in Hateld and Kojima (2010). We will return to this important issue
in Section 5, but for now, we adopt the rst remedy and thereby assume that there
is no a priori structure on hospital choice functions.
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1.3 Stability Under Substitutes and Weakened Substitutes Conditions: A Counter
Example
Stability axiom plays a central role in analysis of two-sided matching models,
and it is extended to matching with contracts as follows:
Denition 1 A set of contracts X 0  X is a stable allocation (or a stable set of
contracts) if
1. CD(X 0) = CH(X 0) = X 0, and
2. there exists no hospital h 2 H and set of contracts X 00 6= Ch(X 0) such that
X 00 = Ch(X 0 [X 00)  CD(X 0 [X 00):
When the rst condition fails, the allocation X 0 fails individual rationality and
there is a blocking doctor or a hospital. When the second condition fails, there is a
blocking coalition made of an hospital h and a subset of doctors fxDgx2X00. In this
case we say that X 00 blocks X 0 .
Hateld and Milgrom (2005) claim that the set of of stable allocations is always
non-empty under the following condition:
Denition 2 Contracts are substitutes for hospital h if there do not exist a set of
contracts Y  X and a pair of contracts x; z 2 X n Y such that
z 62 Ch(Y [ fzg) and z 2 Ch(Y [ fx; zg):
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Loosely speaking, the substitutes condition captures the intuitive idea that a
contract that is rejected from a set of contracts shall remain to be rejected when
there is "increased competition". The following example shows that the set of stable
allocations may be empty under the substitutes condition, in the absence of additional
structure.
Example 1 Consider a problem with one hospital, h, and two doctors d1; d2. Doctor
d1 has two contracts x; x0 and doctor d2 has one contract y. Preferences of the doctors
and the choice function of the hospital are given as follows:
 d1 : x d1 x0 d1 ;d1
 d2 : y d2 ;d2
Ch(fxg) = fxg Ch(fx; x0g) = fxg Ch(fx; x0; yg) = ;
Ch(fx0g) = fx0g Ch(fx; yg) = fyg
Ch(fyg) = fyg Ch(fx0; yg) = fx0g
It is easy to verify that Ch satises the substitutes condition. Moreover no
allocation is stable in this example. Here is a list of blocking coalitions for each
possible allocation:
Allocation Blocking Coalition Allocation Blocking Coalition
fxg fh; d2g via y fx; yg fhg via removing x
fx0g fh; d1g via x fx0; yg fhg via removing y
fyg fh; d1g via x0 ; fh; d1g via x
The existence claim of Hateld and Milgrom (2005) is not only key for several
of their results, but also for a large number of follow-up papers on matching with
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contracts. Primary contributions of Hateld and Kojima (2010) are (1) the intoduc-
tion of two weaker versions of the substitutes condition, and (2) the analysis of the
structure of stable allocations under these weaker conditions. The weakest version of
substitutes introduced in Hateld and Kojima (2010) is the following:
Denition 3 Contracts are bilateral substitutes for hospital h if for any set of con-
tracts Y  X and any pair of contracts x; z 2 X n Y ,
z 62 Ch(Y [ fzg) and z 2 Ch(Y [ fx; zg) =) zD 2 YD or xD 2 YD:
In Theorem 1 of Hateld and Kojima (2010), the authors claim that bilateral
substitutes is su¢ cient for the existence of a stable allocation. More specically,
they claim that the following cumulative o¤er algorithm (Hateld and Kojima 2005)
always produces a stable allocation:
Step 1: One of the doctors o¤ers her rst choice contract x1. The hospital
receiving the o¤er, h1 = (x1)H , holds the contract if x1 2 Ch1
 fx1g and rejects it
otherwise. Let Ah1(1) = fx1g, and Ah(1) = ; for all H n fh1g.
In general, at
Step t: One of the doctors with no contract on hold o¤ers her most preferred
contract xt that has not been rejected in earlier steps. The hospital receiving the
o¤er, ht = (xt)H , holds the contracts in Cht
 
Aht(t   1) [ fxtg

and rejects the rest.
Let Aht(t) = Aht(t  1) [ fxtg, and Ah(t) = Ah(t  1) for all H n fhtg.
The algorithm terminates when either every doctor is matched to at least one hospital
or every unmatched doctor has had all acceptable contracts rejected. Since each
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contract is o¤ered at most once, the algorithm terminates in some nite Step T . The
outcome of the algorithm is,
S
h2H Ch
 
Ah(T )

.3
Given that the original (and stronger) substitutes condition is not su¢ cient for
the existence of a stable allocation, it is clear that Theorem 1 of Hateld and Kojima
(2010) cannot hold in the absence of additional structure.
1.4 A Remedy with the Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts
A close look at the proof of Theorem 1 in Hateld and Kojima (2010) reveals
the source of the complication. The following additional condition on hospital choice
functions is implicitly assumed throughout the paper.
Denition 4 Contracts satisfy the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) for hos-
pital h if
8Y  X;8z 2 X n Y z 62 Ch(Y [ fzg) =) Ch(Y ) = Ch(Y [ fzg):
This condition simply requires that, the removal of rejected contracts shall
not a¤ect chosen sets.4 It turns out that, results of Hateld and Milgrom (2005)
and Hateld and Kojima (2010) are restored once IRC is assumed throughout their
analysis.
3Observe that while the algorithm necessarily terminates, in principle it may pick a set of contracts
which is not an allocation. That is, multiple contracts of a given doctor may be chosen by the
algorithm, in the absence of additional assumptions.
4This condition is earlier used by Blair (1988) in the context of many-to-many matching. In an
extension of Blairs results, Alkan (2002) refers it as consistency . More recently Echenique (2007)
refers this condition as independence of irrelevant alternatives in the context of combinatorial choice
rules.
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In the absence of IRC, of the seven theorems in Hateld and Kojima (2010),
six theorems do not hold. Likewise, in Hateld and Milgrom (2005), several theorems
including existence of stable allocation do not hold. Fortunately, in both cases, all
results are recovered once IRC is assumed in addition to existing hypotheses. In
Appendix, we provide proofs for the modied versions of Theorems 1, 4, and 5 of
Hateld and Kojima (2010) which follow the general ow of the original proofs and
emphasizes the role of IRC. We omit the proof for the modied version of Theorem 3,
since it is not directly related to the structure of stable allocations. We also omit the
proofs for the modied versions of Theorems 6 and 7 of Hateld and Kojima (2010)
since their original proofs are valid, once Theorems 1, 4, and 5 are recovered, without
additional need to invoke IRC.
Recall that the substitutes condition together with IRC guarantee the existence
of a stable allocation. Indeed, the cumulative o¤er algorithm gives the same stable
outcome as the celebrated agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm under these
conditions. This is no longer the case when substitutes is replaced with bilateral
substitutes since a hospital may hold a contract at Step t of the cumulative o¤er
algorithm that was rejected at an earlier Step t0 < t. Hateld and Kojima (2010)
refers this feature as renegotiation. In Theorem 4 of Hateld and Kojima (2010),
the authors claim that the renegotiation feature ceases to exist and the cumulative
o¤er algorithm yields the same outcome as the agent-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm under the following version of substitutes, that is still weaker than Hateld
and Milgrom (2005) substitutes condition, but stronger than the bilateral substitutes:
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Denition 5 Contracts are unilateral substitutes for hospital h if for any set of
contracts Y  X and any pair of contracts x; z 2 X n Y ,
z 62 Ch(Y [ fzg) and z 2 Ch(Y [ fx; zg) =) zD 2 YD:
Showing that the inconsistencies in this important research program can be
eliminated with an easy x is important because bilateral substitutes and unilateral
substitutes have already established themselves not only as important conditions in
theoretical analysis of matching with contracts but also for its practical applications.
While these conditions might initially appear to be minor technical deviations
from the substitutes condition, a recent paper by Echenique (2012) makes it clear
that they di¤er from it in one very signicant way. In a surprising result Echenique
(2012) shows that, Hateld and Milgrom (2005) matching with contracts model is
isomorphic to Kelso and Crawford (1982) labor market model under the substitutes
condition. He has also shown that this isomorphism breaks under bilateral substi-
tutes. Hence applications of matching with contracts that are outside the scope of
Kelso and Crawford (1982) have to rely on conditions other than the substitutes con-
dition. Sonmez and Switzer (2011) - Sonmez (2011) have recently introduced the rst
market design application of matching with contracts of that nature: Cadet-branch
matching at U.S. Army programs. Both of these market design papers heavily uti-
lize the unilateral substitutes condition, and as such it is important to emphasize
that Hateld and Kojima (2010) research program is not broken in a substantial
way. We shall also emphasize that market design applications of matching with con-
tracts, including cadet-branch matching, are shielded from our criticism, since these
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applications almost always satisfy IRC.
1.5 Relation with the Law of Aggregate Demand
Much of the literature on matching with contracts, including several results
in Hateld and Milgrom (2005), assumes the following condition in addition to the
substitutes condition.
Denition 6 Contracts satisfy the law of aggregate demand (LAD) for hospital h if
8Y; Y 0  X;8z 2 X n Y Y  Y 0 =) jCh(Y )j  jCh(Y 0)j:
A bit of a good news is that substitutes along with LAD implies IRC, and
hence results in the literature assuming LAD are immune to our criticism.
Proposition 1 Suppose contracts satisfy the substitutes condition along with the
LAD condition for hospital h. Then contracts also satisfy the IRC condition for
hospital h.
Proof. Suppose contracts satisfy the substitutes condition along with the LAD
condition for hospital h. Let Y  X and z 2 X n Y be such that z 62 Ch(Y [ fzg).
We want to show that Ch(Y ) = Ch(Y [ fzg).
For any x 2 Ch(Y [ fzg), we have x 6= z by assumption. This implies x 2 Y
which in turn implies x 2 Ch(Y ) by the substitutes condition. Therefore
Ch(Y [ fzg)  Ch(Y ).
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Moreover we havejCh(Y )j  jCh(Y [ fzg)j by the LAD and hence the above
inclusion must hold with equality completing the proof.
Recall that results of Hateld and Milgrom (2005) which assume LAD in addi-
tion to the substitutes condition are accurate. It turns out that, in contrast, Theorem
1 of Hateld and Kojima (2010) fails to hold even if LAD is assumed. The following
example shows that, not only the cumulative o¤er algorithm may produce an unstable
allocation under unilateral substitutes, which is stronger than bilateral substitutes,
and LAD, but also the set of stable allocations may be empty under these conditions:
Example 2 Consider a problem with one hospital, h, and two doctors d1; d2. Doctor
d1 has three contracts x; x0; x00 and doctor d2 has two contracts y; y0. Preferences of
the doctors and the choice function of the hospital are given as follows:
 d1 : x d1 x0 d1 x00 d1 ;d1
 d2 : y0 d2 y d2 ;d2
Ch(fxg) = fxg Ch(fx; x0g) = fxg Ch(fx0; yg) = fyg
Ch(fx0g) = fx0g Ch(fx; x00g) = fxg Ch(fx0; y0g) = fx0g
Ch(fx00g) = fx00g Ch(fx0; x00g) = fx0g Ch(fx00; yg) = fyg
Ch(fyg) = fyg Ch(fx; yg) = fyg Ch(fx00; y0g) = fx00g
Ch(fy0g) = fy0g Ch(fx; y0g) = fxg Ch(fy; y0g) = fyg
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Ch(fx; x0; x00g) = fxg Ch(fx; y; y0g) = fyg Ch(fx; x0; x00; yg) = fyg
Ch(fx; x0; yg) = fyg Ch(fx0; x00; yg) = fyg Ch(fx; x0; x00; y0g) = fxg
Ch(fx; x0; y0g) = fxg Ch(fx0; x00; y0g) = fx0g Ch(fx; x0; y; y0g) = fyg
Ch(fx; x00; yg) = fyg Ch(fx0; y; y0g) = fyg Ch(fx; x00; y; y0g) = fyg
Ch(fx; x00; y0g) = fxg Ch(fx00; y; y0g) = fyg Ch(fx0; x00; y; y0g) = fyg
Ch(fx; x0; x00; y; y0g) = fx; yg
It is easy to verify that contracts satisfy unilateral substitutes as well as the
LAD condition for hospital h.
Consider the cumulative o¤er algorithm and start the sequence of o¤ers with
doctor d1. Hospital h receives the following sequence of o¤ers: x; y0; y; x0; x00. The cu-
mulative o¤er algorithm terminates when all contracts are o¤ered, and at this point
Ch(fx; x0; x00; y; y0g) = fx; yg. Hence the outcome is fx; yg. However the allocation
fx; yg is not stable, since hospital h blocks it: Ch(fx; yg) = fyg. This directly con-
icts with the proof of Theorem 1 in Hateld and Kojima (2010) where the authors
argue that the cumulative o¤er algorithm always results in a stable allocation under
bilateral substitutes. Indeed, not only the cumulative o¤er algorithm yields an unsta-
ble allocation in this example, but also the set of stable allocations is empty. Here is
a list of blocking coalitions for every possible allocation in this example.
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Allocation Blocking Coalition Allocation Blocking Coalition
fxg fh; d2g via y fx; yg fhg via removing x
fx0g fh; d2g via y fx0; yg fhg via removing y
fx00g fh; d2g via y fx00; yg fhg via removing x
fyg fh; d2g via y0 fx; y0g fhg via removing y0
fy0g fh; d1g via x fx0; y0g fhg via removing x00
fx00; y0g fhg via removing y0
1.6 Strict Hospital Preferences as Primitives
We have so far argued that the preferred way to recover the results of Hateld
and Kojima (2010) is
1. maintaining the original structure that allows for weak hospital preferences over
sets of contracts that name them,
2. but adjusting the original results by imposing the IRC condition on hospital
choice functions throughout the analysis.
This approach allows us to treat hospital choice functions as primitives of
the model, consistent with the presentation of several of the results in Hateld and
Kojima (2010). One might be tempted instead to recover the results by assuming
hospitals have strict preferences, since IRC is directly implied in this case. We will
next present why this would be a poor modeling choice.
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Loss of Transparency via a Priori Structure Imposed Hospital Choice Functions Lets
suppose each hospital h has a strict preference relation h over
n
Y  Xhj y; y0 2 Y and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
, and
for a given set of contracts X 0  X its chosen set Ch(X 0) is derived as
Ch(X
0) = max
h
n
Y  X 0 \Xhj y; y0 2 Y and y 6= y0 =) yD 6= y0D
o
.
Under this modeling choice, chosen sets are derivatives of strict hospital preferences,
and as such, they must be consistent with these preferences. One potential appeal of
this approach is, it assures that the resulting hospital choice functions automatically
satisfy the IRC condition.5 The IRC condition, however, is not the only condition
that shall be satised by the resulting hospital choice functions. They shall also
satisfy the following condition to assure that the underlying hospital preferences are
transitive.
Denition 7 Contracts satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) for
hospital h, if there is no distinctX1; X2; : : : ; Xk  X and no distinct Y 1; Y 2; : : : ; Y k 
X with k > 1, such that
8l 2 f1; : : : ; kg Y l = Ch(X l), and
8l 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g Y l  X l \X l+1 and Y k  Xk \X1
So before the analysis even starts, there is strong a priori structure imposed on
hospital choice functions under this approach. This is especially troubling since the
5See, for example, Lemma 1 in Hateld, Immorlica and Kominers (2012) for a short proof of this
observation.
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key results of Hateld and Kojima (2010) concern the impact of particular properties
of hospital choice functions on sets of stable allocations or mechanisms that select
stable allocations. A loose analogy here would be, trying to appreciate a picture that
is drawn on top of another picture. To illustrate how this a¤ects the interpretation of
their results, lets take Theorem 1 of Hateld and Kojima (2010). This result reads:
"Result 1: Suppose that contracts are bilateral substitutes for every hospital.
Then there exists a stable allocation."
The reader, however, is expected to interpret this statement as follows:
"Consider hospital choice functions that can be obtained from strict hospital
preferences via derivation above. In addition, suppose that contracts are bilateral
substitutes for every hospital. Then there exists a stable allocation."
As such, the exact role of bilateral substitutes in this existence result is not
transparent. Perhaps the existence is "mostly" due to the underlying structure of
feasible hospital choice functions which is already imposed before bilateral substitutes.
Hence all results shall be interpreted in the context of an underlying structure which
is not even discussed in the paper.
At the end, majority of results in Hateld and Kojima (2010) rely on IRC no
matter how the ambiguity is resolved. When hospital choice functions are treated
as primitives (or alternatively when underlying hospital preferences allow for indif-
ferences), this condition is explicitly stated in the results. When hospital preferences
are strict, this condition is not only hidden in the results, but also accompanied by
another implicit assumption, SARP, which has no role in any of the proofs. We next
elaborate on how this redundancy reects itself on applications of this important
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research program.
As far as we can see, SARP is not needed in any of the proofs of Hateld and
Milgrom (2005). Hence assuming that hospital choice functions are derivatives of the
underlying strict hospital preferences not only imposes a strong structure on "feasible"
choice functions on which the substitutes condition must be superimposed, but also
potentially weakens the scope of their analysis. As such, assuming hospital choice
functions to be primitives of the model and restating the results by explicitly assuming
IRC might be the preferred approach. If, however, one takes strict hospital preference
relations to be primitives, it is important to understand how SARP interacts with
the substitutes condition. Here an important observation is, as in the case of the
IRC condition, SARP might be violated even when contracts satisfy the substitutes
condition. However, as we show next, the substitutes condition together with IRC
implies SARP.
Proposition 2 Suppose contracts satisfy the substitutes condition along with the
IRC condition for hospital h. Then contracts also satisfy SARP for hospital h.
Proof. Suppose contracts satisfy the substitutes condition along with the
IRC condition for hospital h. Towards a contradiction, suppose SARP is violated.
Then there exists distinct X1; X2; : : : ; Xk  X and distinct Y 1; Y 2; : : : ; Y k  X with
k > 1, such that
8l 2 f1; : : : ; kg Y l = Ch(X l), and
8l 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g Y l  X l \X l+1 and Y k  Xk \X1
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Dene X =
S
lkX
l, Y =
S
lk Y
l, and Y =
T
lk Y
l. Also dene Y k+1  Y 1 and
Xk+1  X1 for notational convenience. For any x 2 X,
x 2 X n Y =) 9l  k s.t. x 2 X l n Y l =) x =2 Ch(X) (1)
where the last implication holds by the substitutes condition. Moreover for any x 2 X,
x 2 Y n Y =) 9l  k s.t. x 2 Y l n Y l+1 =) x 2 X l+1 n Y l+1 =) x =2 Ch(X) (2)
where the second implication holds by the relation Y l  X l \X l+1  X l+1 and the
third implication holds by the substitutes condition. Therefore by (1) and (2) we
have, for any x 2 X,
x 2 X n Y =) x =2 Ch(X) =) Ch(X)  Y (3)
Pick any l  k. We have X  X l  Y l  Y  Ch(X) where the last inclusion
holds by (3). Therefore for any l  k, we must have Y l = Ch(X l) = Ch(X) by IRC
contradicting the distinct choice of sets Y 1; Y 2; : : : ; Y k and completing the proof.
An immediate corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is the following.
Corollary 1 Suppose contracts satisfy the substitutes condition along with the LAD
condition for hospital h. Then contracts also satisfy SARP for hospital h.
Reduced Scope of the Analysis None of the results in Hateld and Kojima (2010)
rely on the SARP condition as discussed here, and its sole purpose is assuring the
existence of underlying strict preferences for the hospitals. While it is certainly im-
portant to cover choice functions that are derivatives of strict hospital preferences,
imposing such a structure signicantly reduces the scope of the analysis without any
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clear benet. Indeed, Sonmez and Switzer (2011) and Sonmez (2011) have recently
presented the rst practical application of the unilateral substitutes condition in a
brand new application of market design, cadet-branch matching, and this rst appli-
cation builds on choice functions that are derivatives of branch priorities that capture
Army policies, and they are not derivatives of branch preferences. This and similar
potential applications of Hateld and Kojima (2010) might be left outside the scope
of their paper, if hospital choice functions are required to be derivatives of underlying
strict preferences.
Adverse Impact on Interpretation of the Results While the substitutes condition and
SARP are logically independent in the absence of other conditions, the substitutes
condition together with IRC (or alternatively together with LAD) imply SARP (Ay-
gun and Sonmez 2012). What that means is, once IRC is assured, the substitutes
condition guarantee the existence of underlying strict hospital preferences. It turns
out that, this result has no counterpart for bilateral substitutes or even for the stronger
unilateral substitutes. In other words relaxing the substitutes condition to its weaker
versions may not be "free." This is in sharp contrast with the authorsinterpretation
of their results, and promotion of their weaker substitutes conditions. To illustrate
this point, consider the following statement in page 1715:
"We have seen that the bilateral substitutes condition is a useful notion in
matching with contracts in the sense that it is the weakest condition guaranteeing the
existence of a stable allocation known to date."
Since bilateral substitutes guarantee existence of a stable allocation only in
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the presence of an underlying structure a priori imposed on hospital choice functions,
the interaction of bilateral substitutes with the underlying structure is important. In
the presence of IRC, the substitutes condition guarantee compatibility with the un-
derlying structure, whereas bilateral substitutes or unilateral substitutes do not. As
such, bilateral substitutes (or unilateral substitutes) can no longer be considered to
be a "costless" relaxation of the substitutes condition. Observe that this issue is en-
tirely caused by compatibility with SARP, which was never needed in entire analysis.
Therefore taking strict hospital preferences as primitives of the model introduces an
articial di¢ culty in interpretation of the role of the weaker substitutes conditions.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
We presented two remedies to resolve a critical inconsistency in Hateld and
Milgrom (2005) and Hateld and Kojima (2010). We believe the rst one which
essentially treats hospital choice functions as the primitives of the model is the sci-
entically sound remedy since it maintains the transparency of the results, increases
the scope of the paper by embracing applications such as cadet-branch matching,
and allows for more transparent comparisons between the roles of various substitutes
conditions. It is important to emphasize that market design applications of matching
with contracts almost always satisfy the IRC condition, and therefore shielded from
our criticism.
Our observations have potentially adverse implications on a large number of
follow-up papers on matching with contracts. However two strands of the literature
are mostly shielded from our criticism. A signicant portion of the literature assume
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LAD in addition to the substitutes condition. Substitutes along with LAD implies
IRC and hence our criticism has no bite under LAD. In addition, market design ap-
plications of matching with contracts, including the earlier mentioned applications on
school choice with soft caps and cadet-branch matching, typically construct choice
sets based on other primitives including but not limited to preferences, thereby auto-
matically satisfy the IRC condition. Therefore most of the results in market design
applications are likely correct, even though their proofs might be slightly inaccurate.
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1.9 Appendix
Proofs for Modied Versions of Theorems 1, 4 and 5
We will mostly follow the general outline of the original proofs in Hateld and
Kojima (2010), so that the extensive role of IRC can be clearly observed.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of Hateld and Kojima (2010)) Suppose that contracts
are bilateral substitutes for every hospital and they satisfy IRC. Then there exists a
stable allocation.
Proof. Suppose that contracts are bilateral substitutes for every hospital and
they satisfy IRC. We will show that the cumulative o¤er algorithm yields a stable
allocation under these conditions. Cumulative o¤er algorithm always terminates in
nite steps and produces a set of contracts since there are nite number of contracts,
and no contract can be o¤ered more than once. Let the algorithm terminate at Step
T producing the set of contracts X 0. We want to show that X 0 is a stable allocation.
We rst show that X 0 is an allocation. To do so, we will show that no doctor
can have multiple contracts in his name under X 0. This is a direct implication of
the following Claim which states that a hospital cannot hold at any step a contract
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it rejected in the previous step unless in the previous step it holds another contract
of the same doctor. This does not rule out the possibility that a previously rejected
contract to be held later on, but it rules out the possibility that multiple contracts of
the same doctor to be on hold at any given step across all hospitals.
Claim 1 For any h 2 H, z 2 X with zH = h, and t  2,
z 2 Ah(t  1) n Ch(Ah(t  1)) and zD =2 [Ch(Ah(t  1))]D =) z =2 Ch(Ah(t)).
Proof. Proof of the Claim: We have three cases to consider.
Case 1 : Hospital h receives no o¤ers at Step t. This case immediately follows
since Ah(t  1) = Ah(t).
Case 2 : Hospital h receives an o¤er z0 from doctor zD at Step t. Since
z 2 Ah(t   1), we have z 6= z0, and thus Ah(t) = Ah(t   1) [ fz0g. Towards a
contradiction suppose z 2 Ch(Ah(t)). Then z0 =2 Ch(Ah(t)) and hence by IRC we
have Ch(Ah(t)) = Ch(Ah(t   1)) contradicting z 2 Ah(t   1) n Ch(Ah(t   1)) and
completing Case 2.
Case 3 : Hospital h receives an o¤er x from doctor xD 6= zD at Step t. Let
Y = Ah(t  1) n fy 2 XjyD 2 fxD; zDgg. Observe that xD; zD =2 YD. Since doctor xD
makes an o¤er at Step t, we have xD =2 [Ch(Ah(t  1))]D; furthermore by assumption
zD =2 [Ch(Ah(t  1))]D. Finally by IRC, Ch(Ah(t  1)) = Ch(Y [ fzg), and therefore
z =2 Ch(Y [ fzg), which in turn implies z =2 Ch(Y [ fx; zg) by bilateral substitutes.
Towards a contradiction suppose z 2 Ch(Ah(t)). Since z =2 Ch(Ah(t   1)), that
means Ch(Ah(t   1)) 6= Ch(Ah(t)), which in turn implies x 2 Ch(Ah(t)) by IRC
and Ah(t) = Ah(t   1) [ fxg. Thus x; z 2 Ch(Ah(t)) which means neither doctor
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xD nor doctor zD can have another contacts in Ch(Ah(t)). Therefore IRC implies
x; z 2 Ch(Y [ fx; zg) contradicting relation and completing Case 3. This completes
the proof of the Claim.
We will next show that allocationX 0 is stable. First observe that no doctor can
block X 0 since a doctor never o¤ers an unacceptable contract. Hence CD(X 0) = X 0.
Next suppose CH(X 0) 6= X 0, and observe that CH(X 0) =
S
h2H Ch(Ah(T )) under IRC.
Therefore there exists a hospital h and a contract x such that x 2 Ch(Ah(T )) but
x =2 Ch(Ch(Ah(T ))). This is ruled out by IRC and hence CH(X 0) = X 0.
Finally, towards a contradiction, suppose there exists a hospital h and a set of
contracts X 00 6= Ch(X 0) such that
X 00 = Ch(X 0 [X 00)  CD(X 0 [X 00):
Let X 0h = fx 2 X 0jxH = hg. That is, X 0h is the subset of X 0 that pertains
to hospital h. Observe that X 0h = Ch(Ah(T )) by the mechanics of the cumulative
o¤er algorithm. Also recall that, we have already shown Ch(X 0) = X 0h by the above
individual rationality argument. Hence
X 0h = Ch(X
0) = Ch(Ah(T )).
Since X 00 = Ch(X 0 [ X 00), we have xH = h for all x 2 X 00. Moreover since
X 00  CD(X 0 [X 00),
8x 2 X 00; x xD x0xD
Therefore each contract in X 00 is o¤ered to hospital h by step T by the mechanics of
the cumulative o¤er algorithm. Hence X 00  Ah(T ). This in turn implies
X 00 = Ch(X 0 [X 00) = Ch(X 0h [X 00) = Ch(Ch(X 0) [X 00) = Ch(Ah(T )) = Ch(X 0)
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contradicting X 00 6= Ch(X 0). This shows that X 0 is stable completing the proof.
The next theorem by Hateld and Kojima (2010) states that a contract that
is rejected at any step is rejected for good under unilateral substitutes and IRC.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 4 of Hateld and Kojima (2010)) Suppose that contracts
are unilateral substitutes for every hospital and they satisfy IRC. A contract z that is
rejected by a hospital h at any step of the cumulative o¤er algorithm cannot be held
by hospital h in any subsequent step.
Proof. Towards a contradiction let t0 be the rst step a hospital h holds a
contract z it previously rejected at Step t < t0. Since z is rejected by hospital h at
Step t, either it was on hold by hospital h at Step (t  1) or it was o¤ered to hospital
h at Step t. In either case no other contract of doctor zD could be on hold by hospital
h at Step (t   1). But then, since z is the rst contract to be held after an earlier
rejection, hospital h cannot have held another contract by doctor zD at Step t. That
is,
zD =2 [Ch(Ah(t))]D
Then by IRC z 2 Ah(t) n Ch(Ah(t)) implies
zD =2 Ch (Ch(Ah(t)) [ fzg)
and yet
z 2 Ch(Ah(t0))
Since (Ch(Ah(t)) [ fzg)  Ah(t0), three relations above contradict unilateral substi-
tutes completing the proof.
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Theorem 3 (Theorem 5 of Hateld and Kojima (2010)) Suppose that contracts
are unilateral substitutes for every hospital and they satisfy IRC. Then there exists
a doctor-optimal stable allocation each doctor weakly prefers to any other stable al-
location. The allocation that is produced by the cumulative o¤er algorithm is the
doctor-optimal stable allocation.
Proof. Since unilateral substitutes implies bilateral substitutes, there exists a
stable allocation by Theorem 1 of Hateld and Kojima (2010). To prove the theorem,
it su¢ ces to show that for any stable allocation X 0  X and any contract z 2 X 0,
contract z is not rejected by the cumulative o¤er algorithm. To obtain the desired
contradiction, suppose not. Let t be the rst step where a hospital h = zH rejects such
a contract z, and let Y = Ch(Ah(t)). Then by IRC, z =2 Ch (Y [ fzg). By Theorem
4 of Hateld and Kojima (2010), zD =2 YD. Since t is the rst step a contract in any
stable allocation is rejected, every doctor in YD weakly prefers their contract in Y to
their contract in X 0 which is stable by assumption. We complete the proof via two
cases each of which yields the desired contradiction:
Case 1 : z =2 Ch (Y [X 0). In this case hospital h blocks allocation X 0 together
with doctors in YD (unless YD = ; in which case hospital h blocks X 0 by itself). That
is, Y blocks X 0 contradicting its stability.
Case 2 : z 2 Ch (Y [X 0). This case immediately gives a contradiction by
unilateral substitutes since (Y [ fzg)  (Y [X 0), z =2 Ch (Y [ fzg), and zD =2 YD.
Hateld and Kojima (2010) observe that, the cumulative o¤er algorithm over-
laps with the doctor proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (for any sequence of
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o¤ers). This observation is directly implied by Theorem 5.
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CHAPTER 2.
ORDER INDEPENDENCE OF CUMULATIVE OFFER
ALGORITHM AND CADET QUALITY IN USMA
2.1 Introduction
Matching with contract literature is young and very exciting literature with
its brand new applications. In most of the applications, as in matching literature,
achieving a stable allocation is one of the main goals. In the matching with contracs
literature, the weakest set of conditions known that guarantees existence of stablity
is shown in Aygün and Sönmez (2012) paper. These conditions are bilateral substi-
tutes condition and Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts (IRC) condition. In their paper,
Aygün and Sönmez (2012) showed that under bilateral substitutes and IRC condition
assumptions, existence of stable allocation can be guaranteed. These conditions are
satised by most of the applications of matching with contract literature. To achieve
stable allocation, Hateld and Kojima (2010) described Cumulative O¤er Algorithm
(COA) in the paper and Hateld and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012)
showed that under bilateral substitutes and IRC assumptions, Doctor Proposing COA
produces a stable allocation in any doctor hospital matching problem. In this paper,
we study cadet-branch matching problem and we analyze Cadet Proposing Cumu-
lative O¤er Algorithm. Cadet Proposing version of this algorithm is a generalized
version of the Student Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) described
by Gale and Shapley (1962). There are two main di¤erences between COA and DAA.
The rst one is that COA keeps rejected contracts considered after rejection. The
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second di¤erence is that under COA cadets propose their contracts one by one but
not altogether. Cadets make their o¤er one at a time and in each step cadet is chosen
randomly among the ones whom there is no contract held by a branch.
In the rst part of this paper, we analyze COA and show that the selection of
cadets in each step of COA does not a¤ect the outcome under bilateral substitutes
and IRC condition assumptions. Also under these assumptions, COA eqiuvalent
to Generalized Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (GDAA) described in Hateld and
Milgrom (2005) which allows cadets make their o¤er altogether. In the second part,
we study cadet-branch matching problem where the new choice function we designed
only satises bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions, yet GDAA produces stable
allocation.
The United States Military Academy, to increase manpower in the army,
changed its matching mechanism to match cadets and branches. In the new choice
function used by branches in the allocation process, cadets can get priority for the
%25 of the seats of any branch if they apply with longer term contracts. Therefore,
USMA gives incentive to cadets to serve more and increases manpower in the US
Army. First, we showed that for any given branch, we can increase cadet quality by
changing choice function and to increase cadet quality, we designed a new choice func-
tion for branches. Next, we showed that the new choice function proposed satises
bilateral substitutes and IRC which makes cadet-branch matching problem perferct
application for GDAA if we use new alternative choice function.
Next, we study incentive compatibility property of Cadet Optimal Stable
Mechanism induced by GDAA. Prior to this paper, Hateld and Kojima (2010)
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showed that bilateral substitutes and IRC are not su¢ cient for strategy-proofness
of COA. However, the lexicographic choice functions described in Kominers and Son-
mez (2012) satisfy bilateral substitutes and IRC and guarantee strategy-proofness.
The choice function we suggest is not in the class of lexicographic choice functions.
But, it makes Cadet Optimal Stable Mechanism strategy-proof. Therefore, the ap-
plication we present here is the second application in the matching with contracts
literature such that choice functions only satises the weakest substitutes condition
and IRC, yet makes COA, equivalently GDAA, strategy-proof.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets up the model. After
introducing the model, we analyze order independence property of COA. Then, we
analyze cadet-branch matching problem in USMA and propose an alternative choice
function. It concludes with a brief discussion of the ndings and provides the proofs
for some of the results in the appendix part.
2.2 The Model
There are nite sets I and B of cadets and branches, and a nite set X of
contracts. Each contract x 2 X is associated with one cadet xI 2 I and one branch
xB 2 B. Each cadet i 2 I can sign at most one contract or his null contract which is
denoted by ;i. A set of contracts X 0  X is an allocation if each cadet is associated
with at most one contract under X 0. For any set of contracts Y  X, YI and YB are
the set of cadets and set of branches that has at least one contract in Y respectively.
Also, for any set of contracts Y  X, Y (j) is the subset of Y that includes all
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contracts of j 2 I [B.
For each cadet i 2 I, Pi is a strict preference relation on his contracts X(i) [
f;ig. A contract is acceptable by cadet i if it is at least as good as the null contract
;i, and unacceptable by cadet i if it is worse that the null contract ;i. For each cadet
i 2 I and a set of contracts Y  X, the chosen set Ci(Y ) of cadet i is dened as
Ci(Y ) = max
Pi
(Y (i) [ f;ig).
For a given set of contracts Y  X, dene CI(Y ) 
S
i2I Ci(Y ).
Given a branch b 2 B and any set of contracts Y  X, the chosen set Cb(Y )
of an branch b is a subset of the contracts associated with branch b. That is, Cb(Y ) 
Y (b). Moreover, a branch can sign only one contract with any given cadet:
8b 2 B; 8Y  X;8x; x0 2 Cb(Y ) x 6= x0 =) xI 6= x0I .
For a given set of contracts Y  X, dene CB(Y ) 
S
b2B Cb(Y ). For a given branch
b 2 B, we refer the function that maps each set of contracts to a chosen set as the
choice function of branch b.
In a given cadet-branch matching problem stable allocation can be described
as the situation where no cadet or branch would be better o¤ by either walking away
of forming bilateral arrangements outside of the allocation.
Denition 8 A set of contracts X 0  X is a stable allocation if
1. CI(X 0) = CB(X 0) = X 0, and
2. there exists no branch b 2 B and set of contracts X 00 6= Cb(X 0) such that
X 00 = Cb(X 0 [X 00)  CI(X 0 [X 00).
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As in the matching literature, rst condition of stable allocation is individual
rationality and the second condition is no blocking pair of cadets and branches. By
Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Aygun and Sonmez (2013) papers, we know that if
choice functions of branches satisfy substitutes condition along with IRC condition,
set of stable allocations is not empty and Cadet Proposing GDAA produces a stable
allocation which is Pareto E¢ cient among stable allocations and strategy-proof if
cadets are considered as the only strategic agents in the problem.
Denition 9 A choice function satises substitutes condition if for any set of con-
tracts Y  Y 0  X and a contract x 2 Y;
x =2 C(Y ) =) x =2 C(Y 0)
Denition 10 A choice function satises Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts condi-
tion if for any set of contracts Y; Y 0  X;
C(Y 0)  Y  Y 0 =) C(Y ) = C(Y 0)
In Hateld and Kojima (2010), it is shown that although substitutes condition
is su¢ cient to guarantee existence of stable allocation, it is not necessary. To widen
the scope of the model they dened weaker versions of substitutes condition, unilat-
eral substitutes and bilateral substitutes conditions. The weakest version, bilateral
substitutes condition, is dened below.
Denition 11 A choice function satises bilateral substitutes condition if for any
set of contracts Y  X and a pair of contracts x; y 2 XnY;
x =2 C(Y [ fxg) and x 2 C(Y [ fx; yg) =) xI 2 YI or yI 2 YI
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So, by Hateld and Kojima (2010) and Aygun and Sonmez (2012b) papers,
we know that if choice functions of branches satisfy bilateral substitutes condition
along with IRC condition, set of stable allocations is not empty and Cadet Proposing
GDAA produces a stable allocation. Next, it is shown that substitutes or unilateral
substitutes conditions along with the IRC condition make DAA, COA and GDAA
equivalent. On the other hand, there is no equivalence result for these three algorithms
under bilateral substitutes condition. In this paper, we show that although DAA and
COA are di¤erent due to possible renegotiations, COA and GDAA are equivalent
under bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions.
2.3 Order Independence of Cumulative O¤er Algorithm
In this section, we formally describe GDAA and COA and show the relationship
between these two algorithms.
Generalized Deferred Acceptance Algorithm The generalized deferred acceptance al-
gorithm description we use here, was previously introduced by Hateld and Milgrom
(2005). For any given many to one matching with contracts problem, cadet proposing
GDAA works as the following:
Step 1: All cadets o¤er their rst choice contracts. Call the set of contracts
o¤ered in this stepX1. Let A0(0) = ;, and A0(1) = X1. Each branch b, holds contracts
in set Cb(X1) and rejects the rest of the contracts.
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In general,
Step l  2: All the cadets for whom no contract is currently held by a branch
o¤er their most preferred contracts that has not been rejected in previous steps. Call
the set of contracts o¤ered in this step Xl. Let A0(l) = A0(l   1) [Xl. Each branch
b, holds contracts in set Cb(A0(l)) and rejects the rest of the contracts.
The algorithm terminates when either every cadet has a contract that is held
by a branch or every unmatched cadet has had every acceptable contract rejected.
As there are a nite number of contracts, the algorithm terminates in some nite
number L of steps. At that point, the algorithm produces X 0 =
[
b2B
Cb(A
0(L)), i.e.,
the set of contracts that are held by some branch at the terminal step L.
As we mentioned above, in general, keeping previously rejected contracts avail-
able to branches is the main di¤erence between DAA and GDAA. However, under
substitutes or unilateral substitutes conditions, no rejected contracts have chance to
be chosen in the GDAA. Therefore, DAA and GDAA are equivalent.
Cadet Proposing Cumulative O¤er Algorithm The cumulative o¤er algorithm descrip-
tion we use here, was previously introduced by Hateld and Kojima (2010). For any
given many to one matching with contracts problem, cadet proposing COA works as
the following:
Step 1: One randomly selected cadet i1 o¤ers her rst choice contract x1,
according to her preferences Pi1. The branch that receives the o¤er b1 = x
1
B holds
Cb1(fx1g). Let Ab1(1) = x1, and Ab(1) = ; for all b 6= b1.
In general,
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Step k  2: One of the cadets for whom no contract is currently held by
a branch, say ik, o¤ers the most preferred contract, based on her preferences Pik ,
that has not been rejected in previous steps. Call the new o¤ered contract, xk.
Branch bk = xkB holds Cbk(Abk(k   1) [ fxkg) and rejects all other contracts. Let
Abk(k) = Abk(k   1) [ fxkg, and Ab(k) = Ab(k   1) for all b 6= bk.
The algorithm terminates when either every cadet is matched to a branch or
every unmatched cadet has no contract left to o¤er. The algorithm terminates in
some nite number K of steps due to a nite number of contracts. At that point,
the algorithm produces X 0 =
[
b2B
Cb(Ab(K)), i.e., the set of contracts that are held
by some branch at the terminal step K.
Order Independence of Cumulative O¤er Algorithm Assume that we use cadet propos-
ing cumulative o¤er algorithm described above. In each step, cadet who is proposing
her contract, ik, is randomly selected among cadets for whom no contract is currently
held by a branch. Therefore, in general, outcome of the algorithm depends on the
selection of cadet who makes o¤er in each step. On the other hand, in many appli-
cations we observe that at least bilateral substitutes and IRC are satised and our
main theorem states that under bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions assumptions
outcome of cumulative o¤er algorithm is independent of the selection of cadets.
An order , is a function that gives the name of the cadet that o¤ers a contract
for each step,  : N  ! I. Set of all possible orders is denoted as . For a xed
problem and a cumulative o¤er algoritm, an order  is feasible if each cadet o¤ers a
new contract when their turn comes.
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Denition 12 An order  2  is feasible if 8k; (k) 2 fi 2 I : @x 2 CB(A(k   1))
and xI = ig.
By the denition above, one can say that any cadet proposing cumulative
o¤er process can be described by a feasible order. To prove order independency of
COA, rst we show that under bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions, if all of the
proposed contracts of a cadet are rejected in some step, no other cadet makes the
rejected contracts desirable.
Lemma 1 Assume that all choice functions satisfy bilateral substitutes condition
along with the IRC condition. If  is feasible, a cadet i has no chosen contract at k1
and o¤ers his next contract at k2, then k1 < k < k2 =) @x 2 CB(A(k)) s.t. xI = i.
Unlike unilateral substitutes and substitutes conditions, bilateral substitutes
condition allows renegotiation. Therefore, in general, COA is not equivalent to DAA.
Our rst lemma, Lemma 1, states that renegotiation is possible for chosen cadets
only.
Next, we show that swapping orders of two cadets does not change the outcome.
Assume that we have a feasible order  such that (k) = i0; (k + 1) = i and i 6= i0
for a given k. Now, we construct a new order 0 by swapping i and i0s turns.
0(k) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0(k) = (k + 1) if k = k
0(k) = (k) if k = k + 1
0(k) = (k) otherwise
Lemma 2 Assume that all choice functions satisfy bilateral substitutes condition
along with the IRC condition. For any feasible order , if there is no chosen contract
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of cadet i at step k  1, then the outcome of cumulative algorithm remains the same
if one changes ordering from  to 0.
The lemma above is the main part of the proof ot the main theorem. By
swapping orders of cadets one at a time will let us achieve any feasible order without
changing the outcome. Now, think about the following class of order, :
In the rstK1 period each cadet o¤ers her best contract one at a time. Between
K1 and K2, each cadet for whom no contract is currently held by a branch at K1
(fi 2 I : @x 2 CB(A(K1)) and xI = ig) o¤ers her next best contract among contracts
that are not o¤ered yet. Between Kl 1 and Kl, each cadet for whom no contract is
held by a branch at Kl 1 (fi 2 I : @x 2 C(A(Kl 1)) and xI = ig) o¤ers her next
best contract among contracts that are not o¤ered yet. Algorithm terminates when
either every cadet has a contract held by a branch or every unmatched cadet has no
contract left to o¤er.
Lemma 3 Assume that all choice functions satisfy bilateral substitutes condition
along with the IRC condition. The order  given above is feasible and the outcomes
of all orders in class  are identical.
We are going to use the lemma above to show order independence of cumula-
tive o¤er algorithm by transforming any feasible order to an order in class . The
transformation can be done changing order of cadets one at a time by making all
cadets o¤er their top contracts in the rst K1 steps, making rejected cadets o¤er
their next best contracts in the next K2   K1 steps etc. The rst main theorem is
stated below.
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Theorem 4 Assume that all choice functions satisfy bilateral substitutes condition
along with the IRC condition. Cumulative o¤er algorithm induced by any feasible
order gives unique, stable allocation.1
As a corollary, we can state the equivalence of GDAA and the COA induced
by any feasible order under bilateral substitutable choice functions that satisfy IRC
condition. For any step l of GDAA, set of contracts o¤ered A0(l) is identical to the
set of contracts A(Kl) that is constructed under COA induced by any order in class
. Therefore, under bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions assumption, GDAA
and COA are equivalent. Also, GDAA produces its outcome much faster since it
allows all the cadets o¤er together. The result we mentioned here unies algorithms
used generally in matching with contracts applications. In the rest of the paper, we
present an application of this result in the cadet-branch matching problem in USMA.
2.4 Cadet-Branch Matching Problem in USMA
Prior to 2006, cadet-branch assignment in USMA was a typical application
of Balinski and Sonmez (1999). Assignment used to be done according to cadets
preferences over branches and their unique priority ranking. These priorities are
known as order of merit list (OML) that is based on order of merit score which is
a weighted average of cadets academic performance, physical tness test score and
military performance. Prior to 2006, USMA used serial dictatorship as a matching
mechanism to assign cadets to branches due to the unique priority structure. At
1This theorem is independently studied and proved by Hirata and Kasuya (2014).
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the end of the assignment process, cadets used to serve 5 years at the army branch
assigned.
As of 2006, USMA changed its policy on cadet-branch assignment to increase
manpower in the US Army. The new policy introduced two new aspect to this as-
signment problem. The rst one is introducing 8-year contract. By introducing the
8-year contracts USMA aimed to increase manpower. The second one is giving cadets
incentive to sign 8-year contracts by giving higher priority for 25% of the seats in all
branches.
There are nite sets I = fi1; i2; : : : ; ing and B = fb1; b2; : : : ; bmg of cadets and
branches. Each branch b has its own capacity qb and
P
b2B qb  n. There are two
possible serving times for each cadet (t0; t+). In our setup, t0 represents ve years
serving time, or "low cost", and t+ represents eight years serving time, or "high cost".
Set T is the potential contract terms. Order of merit list for each cadet is determined
by a priority ranking function  : I ! f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
A contract x 2 X is a tuple (i; b; t), where i 2 I, b 2 B and t 2 T . For
a contract x; xI , xB and xT represent cadet, branch and term of the contract x
respectively. Let X be the set of all contracts. For any cadet i 2 I, Pi is the
preference of cadet i over her possible contracts and being unassigned X(i)[f;g. Let
Pi be the set of all possible preferences over contracts for cadet i. An allocation is a
set of contracts X 0  X, such that for every i 2 I and every b 2 B, jX 0(i)j  1 and
jX 0(b)j  qb. Let  be set of all possible allocations.
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USMA Priorities In general, the chosen set of branch b from a set of contacts Y
depends on the policy on who has higher claims for slots in branch b. Here our focus
is the current USMA policy, where cadets with higher OML ranking have higher
claims for the top (1  )qb slots and the priority for the last qb slots is adjusted to
favor cadets who are willing to pay the increased service cost. We are ready to dene
the USMA chosen set of branch b from a set of contracts Y .
For a given order-of-merit priority ranking ,  2 [0; 1] and Y , chosen set
Cb(Y ) is constructed as follows:
1. Branch chooses contracts of cadets based on their OML rankings, one contract
at a time. If there are two contracts of a cadet, branch chooses the one with
lower cost, t0 and rejects the other. Either all contracts will be considered or
(1   )qb contracts are chosen. If the former happens branch terminates the
procedure and rejects all the remaining contracts if the latter happens then
branch continues with the next step.
2. Branch only considers contracts with high cost, t+. Branch chooses contracts
of cadets based on their OML rankings, one contract at a time. If there are two
contracts in Y of a cadet whose contract is chosen in this step, branch chooses
the one with high cost, t+ and rejects the other. Either qb contracts are chosen
or all contracts with high cost, t+, will be considered. If the former happens
branch terminates the procedure and rejects all the remaining contracts if the
latter happens then branch continues with the next step.
3. All the remaining contracts are low cost contracts by construction. Branch
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chooses contracts of cadets based on their OML rankings, one contract at a
time. Branch terminates the procedure when either all the remaining contracts
are chosen or qb contracts chosen.
In this paper, our objective is choosing "better" sets of cadets for any given
branch. The idea of choosing better set is based on responsive preferences in college
admission problem. As we mentioned, before 2006, branches were used to choose their
cadets based on single OML rankings. Given any set of applications branches chose
top cadets in the application pool up to their capacities. In that sense, prior to 2006,
branches had responsive preferences. Like the college admission with a¢ rmative
action problems, due to the new policy shift in 2006, responsive choices are not
available for branches anymore. However, by replacing lower ranked cadets with
higher ranked cadets without hurting incentive policy introduced by USMA, we can
choose sets of cadets closer to a responsive choice function chooses. Next, example
shows that if there exists a cadet that prefers a contract with the higher cost to a
contract with the base cost, choice function derived from USMA priorities may not
choose best set of cadets among the available contract set.
Example 3 Let I = (i1; i2; i3); B = fbg with qb = 2. Let the merit ranking be (i1) <
(i2) < (i3) and  = 0:5. Let Y = f(i1; b; t+); (i2; b; t0); (i3; b; t+)g. If we use choice
function derived from USMA priorities we get CUSMAb (Y ) = f(i1; b; t+); (i3; b; t+)g.
Therefore, cadets i1; i3 will be chosen by branch b. However, if we use choice function
described above we get C 0b(Y ) = f(i1; b; t+); (i2; b; t0)g. Here cadets i1; i2 will be chosen
by branch b. which improves cadet quality of branch b without violating reserve for
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contracts with the higher cost t+.
Denition 13 A choice function C() is q-acceptant if for any set of contracts Y 
X,
jC(Y )j = minfjYI j; qg
For any given set of cadets I 0 = (i1; : : : ; ijI0j)  I function O(j; I 0) is internal
order of cadets and dened as the following:
O(1; I 0) = argmin
i2I0
(i)
O(; I 0) = arg min
i2I0n[j<O(j;I0)
(i)
Denition 14 Among two q-acceptant choice functions C() and C 0(), C() domi-
nates C 0() if for any set of contracts Y  X such that jYI j > q and any  2 f1; : : : ; qg,
(O(; C 0(Y )I))  (O(; C(Y )I)).
Alternative Choice Function For a given order-of-merit priority ranking,  2 [0; 1]
and Y chosen set Cb(Y ) is constructed as follows:
1. Branch chooses contracts of cadets based on their OML rankings, one contract
at a time. If there are two contracts of a cadet, branch chooses the one with
lower cost, t0 and rejects the other. During the process if the number of chosen
contracts with low cost, t0, reaches (1   )qb, branch tentatively rejects all
remaining contracts with the with low cost and continue with the contracts with
the high cost, t+. If qb contracts are chosen, branch terminates the procedure
and rejects all remaining and tentatively rejected contracts. If all contracts are
considered and jCb(Y )j; qb, branch continues with the next step.
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2. Branch rejects tentatively rejected contracts of cadets that have a chosen con-
tract in the rst step.
3. For the remaining potential elements of Cb(Y ), branch only considers contracts
tentatively rejected contracts in Phase 1 and chooses contracts of cadets based
on their OML rankings, one contract at a time. Branch terminates the procedure
when either all the tentatively rejected contracts are chosen or qb contracts
chosen.
Proposition 3 The alternative choice function, C 0(), dened above dominates choice
function induced by USMA priorities, CUSMA().
Following example shows that contracts are not necessarily unilateral substi-
tutes under the choice function described above.
Example 4 Let I = (i1; i2; i3); B = fbg with qb = 2. Let the merit ranking be
(i1) < (i2) < (i3) and  = 0:5. Let Y = f(i1; b; t+); (i2; b; t0); (i3; b; t+)g and Y 0 =
f(i1; b; t0); (i1; b; t+); (i2; b; t0); (i3; b; t+)g. We have C 0b(Y ) = f(i1; b1; t+); (i2; b1; t0)g
and C 0b(Y
0) = f(i1; b; t0); (i3; b; t+)g. Hence, even though contract (i3; b; t+), the only
contract of cadet i3 in Y , is rejected from Y , it is not rejected from Y 0  Y .
Proposition 4 Elements of X are bilateral substitutes for each branch b under the
choice function dened above.
Proposition 5 The alternative choice function satises IRC condition.
A mechanism is a strategy space i for each cadet i along with an outcome
function ' : (i1 ;i2 ; : : : ;in)!  that selects an allocation for each strategy vector
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(i1 ; i2 ; : : : ; in) 2 (i1 ;i2 ; : : : ;in). Given a cadet i and a strategy prole i 2 i,
let  i denote the strategy of all cadets except cadet i. A direct mechanism is a
mechanism where strategies are preferences over contracts. Hence a direct mechanism
is simply a function  : (Pi)n !  that selects an allocation for each preference prole.
Cadet Optimal Stable Mechanism is a direct mechanism where cadets submit
their preferences over contracts and central authority runs cadet proposing generalized
deferred acceptance algorithm with submitted preferences and some choice functions
(Cb())b2B. By the help of propositions above, one can guarantee existence of stability.
Next proposition states that stable allocation can be achieved by Cadet Optimal
Stable Mechanism.
Proposition 6 Cadet Optimal Stable Mechanism induced by alternative choice func-
tion C 0() is a stable machanism.
Cadet Sub-Branch Matching Problem In this section, we are going to study incentive
properties of cadet optimal stable mechanism induced by alternative choice func-
tion. It is well known by Hateld and Kojima (2010) that bilateral substitutes prop-
erty, even along with LAD, is not su¢ cient for existence of strategy-proof and stable
mechansims. Although, Kominers and Sonmez (2013) provides a class of choice func-
tions satisfying only bilateral substitutes and making cadet proposing COA strategy-
proof, the alternative choice function proposed here is not in that class. In order
to show strategy-proofness of Cadet Optimal Stable Mechanism, in this section, we
are going to construct a new problem which is parallel to our cadet branch matching
problem.
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To construct a cadet sub-branch matching problem we extend the contract set
X to the set ~X dened by
~X  fhx; si = h(i; b; t); si : x 2 X and s = 1; 2g
Consider a parallel problem where each branch b is divided into two sub-
branches, i.e. b1 and b2, where qb1 = qb(1   ) and qb2 = qb. In this setup, for any
contract hx; si, s denotes the sub-branch associated with the contract and preference
of cadet i, P i ,over the contracts in set ~X are as the following:
h(i; b; t0); 1iP i h(i; b; t0); 2iP i h(i; b0; t0); si ; for s = 1; 2 if (i; b; t0)Pi(i; b0; t0)
h(i; b; t+); 2iP i h(i; b; t+); 1iP i h(i; b0; t0); si ; for s = 1; 2 if (i; b; t+)Pi(i; b0; t0)
For any branch b, choice functions of b1 and b2 are examples of lexicographic
choice functions described in Kominers and Sonmez (2013). The priorities of slots
and the precedence orders are the following:
Cb1(Y ):
All the slots give priority based on OML ranking of cadets and among the
contracts of same cadet priority is given to contracts with low cost. Since all priorities
are the same, any precedence order produces the same choice choice function.
Cb2(Y ):
All the slots prefer high cost contracts to low cost contracts and among the
contracts of same cost, priority is given based on merit list of cadet. Since all priorities
are the same, any precedence order produces the same choice choice function.
It is clear that any allocation in the parallel cadet-branch matching problem,
say ~X 0  ~X, corresponds to an allocation in original cadet-branch matching problem,
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X 0  X. This correspondence can be shown by the following projection, $:
$( ~X 0)  fx 2 X : hx; si 2 ~X 0 for some s 2 f1; 2gg
We start with existence of stability in the cadet sub-branch matching problem.
In order to guarantee existence of stable allocation and strategy-proofness of cadet
proposing COA in cadet sub-branch problem, we are going to use following properties
mentioned in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 4 For any branch b, choice functions Cb1 and Cb2 satises substitutes con-
dition.
Lemma 5 For any branch b, choice functions Cb1 and Cb2 satises IRC condition.
Lemma 6 For any branch b, choice functions Cb1 and Cb2 satises LAD condition.
Three lemmas above help us to utilize theorem 1 and theorem 11 in Hat-
eld and Milgrom (2005) and theorem 1 in Aygun and Sonmez (2013) to show that
cadet proposing COA gives stable allocation and is strategy-proof in cadet sub-branch
matching problem. Next, we are going to show that the allocation chosen by cadet
proposing COA in cadet sub-branch matching problem coincides with the allocation
chosen by cadet proposing COA in original cadet branch matching problem.
Proposition 7 For any cadet-branch matching problem with preference prole (Pi)i2I ,
outcome of cumulative o¤er process, ~X 0, for cadet-branch matching problem with pref-
erence prole (P i )i2I , is identical to outcome of cumulative o¤er process, X
0, for
cadet-branch matching problem under projection $:
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In the nal step, we are going to dene strategy-proofness formally and show
this property on cadet optimal stable mechanism.
Denition 15 A mechanism is strategy-proof if
@i 2 I; @ i 2
Y
j2Infig
j and @Pi; P 0i 2 i; such that  (P 0i ;  i)Pi (Pi;  i).
The denition above states that for any cadet, no matter what preference a
cadet has and no matter what kind of strategies other cadets submit, submitting
actual preferences over contracts should be weakly dominant strategy.
Theorem 5 Cadet Optimal Stable Mechanism induced by alternative choice function
C 0() is strategy-proof.
By the teorem above, we showed that by a small modication branches can
choose better set of cadets without sacricing useful properties of allocation mecha-
nism such as stability and strategy-proofness.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we rst studied properties of cumulative o¤er algorithm which is
designed to produce a stable allocation for matching with contracts problems. Next,
we presented a new market design application where our result help us to design a
mechanism which gives identical outcome with the COA and process ends in fewer
steps. The application we introduce is particularly interesting in the sense that the
choice function we designed is the second in the literature that satises only weakest
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substitutes condition, yet strategy proofness of the mechanism is preserved. Also, rst
time in literature, we dealt with constrained responsive preferences due to incentive
objectives of USMA. On the other hand, this issue is not unique to this problem,
since in any a¢ rmative action model schools, rms etc. cannot use their responsive
preferences. Therefore, the choice function suggested here may serve as a second best.
This paper shows that for a given set of applications, the current USMA prior-
ities may not choose top cadets if there exists a cadet preferring long term contracts
to short term contracts.
We proposed a new choice function that can also be used together with the
cadet optimal stable mechanism to generate assignments. The choice function chooses
a "better" set of cadets than current USMA priorities for any given set of contracts.
Moreover, the mechanism we suggest is strategy-proof and yields a stable allocation
for any problem.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that is not true. Therefore, there is a contract
y such that yI = i and a step k such that @x 2 CB(A(k   1)) and xI = i, and
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y 2 CB(A(k)). Let (k) = i0 and y0 be the contract o¤ered by i0 at step k . We can
construct two sets Y and Y 0 in the following way:
Y = A(k   1) n fx 2  : xD 2 fi; i0gg
Y 0 = Y [ fy; y0g
In words, to costruct Y we remove all rejected contracts of i and i0 at k 1 and
for Y 0 we just add contracts y and y0 to set Y . By feasibility of the order  and our
assumption, no contract that belongs to cadets i and i0 are chosen in step k 1. Next,
by IRC condition, CB(Y ) = CB(A(k   1)) since there is no chosen contract of i or i0
at k   1 and CB(Y 0) = CB(A(k)) since all contracts we removed are some rejected
contracts of i or i0 at k. Also, by IRC condition y =2 C(Y [ fyg), since Y [ fyg is a
subset of A(k   1) and includes all chosen contracts in A(k   1).
Since choice functions C() satises bilateral substitution condition and there
is no contract of i and i0 in Y , following must be true:
y =2 C(Y [ fyg) =) y =2 C(Y [ fy; y0g)
However, by our assumption we have y 2 C(A(k)) = C(Y 0) = C(Y [ fy; y0g),
a contradiction. Hence, for any step k1 < k < k2 we have @x 2 C(A(k)) s.t. xI = i.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, one can observe that up to step k   1, A(k)
and outcomes of CB(A(k)) under both orders  and 
0 are identical. By lemma 1, we
know that there is no chosen contract of cadet i at step k, so cadet i can o¤er her
next best contract without violating feasibility of the order. Also, under 0, we can
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say that there is no chosen contract of cadet i0 at step k  1, because A(k  1)s are
identical under both orders and we know that i0 o¤ers a new contract at k under ,
that means there is no chosen contract of cadet i0 at step k   1 under 0. Then, by
the help of lemma 1, we can say that cadet is o¤er at k does not make any contract
of i0 chosen, so i0 can make her new o¤er at step k+1 without violating feasibility of
the order. Therefore, A(k+1) and C(A(k+1)) under both orders are still identical.
Since order of cadets are the same for the rest of the steps under  and 0, A(k) and
C(A(k)) under both orders are the same for the rest. Hence, outcome of cumulative
o¤er algorithm remains unchanged.
Proof of Lemma 3. First of all, we are going to show that  is feasible.
For 0 < k  K1, each cadet o¤ers her rst contracts. So feasibility is not violated in
the rst K1 step.
ForK1 < k  K2, each cadet (k) for whom no contract is held by a branch at
K1 o¤ers her next contract at time k. By lemma 1, we know that rst o¤er of 
(k) is
not accepted before time K1. So, for K1 < k  K2, (k) =2 fi 2 I : 9x 2 C(A(k 1))
and xI = ig. Hence, feasibility is not violated in the rst K2 steps.
For steps between Kl 1 and Kl, each cadet 
(k) for whom no contract is
currently held by a branch at Kl 1 o¤ers her next contract at time k. By lemma 1, we
know that any o¤er of (k) is not accepted before time Kl 1. So, for Kl 1 < k  Kl,
(k) =2 fi 2 I : 9x 2 C(A(k 1)) and xI = ig. Hence, feasibility is satised in the rst
Kl steps. Since l is arbitrary, one can say that 8k; (l) 2 I nfi 2 I : 9x 2 C(A(k 1))
s.t. xI = ig. Hence,  is feasible.
Next, we are going to show that any order in the class  gives identical out-
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come. For any cumulative o¤er algorithm induced by an order in class , no matter
what is the order between 0 and K1, one gets A(K1) at the end of step K1. Since
A(K1) and set of cadets giving new o¤ers between K1 and K2 are the same for any
order, one gets A(K2) at the end of step K2. By induction, A(Kl) for any l should
be the same for any order in class . Hence, outcomes for any order in class  must
be identical.
Proof of Theorem 4. Stability of outcome comes directly from Hateld and
Kojima (2010) and Aygun and Sonmez (2012). We are going to prove that outcomes
for any feasible order of o¤ering are identical. To prove this theorem, we are going to
convert any feasible order to some order in class  without changing outcome.
In the rst step, consider cadets o¤ering their rst contracts. By lemma 1,
we know that we can swap their turn with the ones come before them. So, one can
change their rst o¤ering times one at a time and make them o¤er their rst contract
in the rst K1 steps without changing outcome. Let the new order be 
1.
In the second step, consider set of cadets for whom no contract is currently
held by a branch at K1. Since 
1 is feasible, 1(K1 + 1) should o¤er her next best
contract. Take the second cadet making her next o¤er. Since that doctor is rejected
at stepK1, by lemma 1, we can say that she has no accepted contract two steps before
her next o¤er and we can swap her turn with the one who o¤ered before her. By
doing this procedure one at a time, we can change her turn to K1 + 2. Then we can
use the same technique to change o¤ering orders of other cadets in the set and make
them o¤er their next best contracts in steps between K1 and K2 without changing
outcome. Let the new order be 2.
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In step l, consider set of cadets for whom no contract is currently held by
a branch at Kl 1. Since 
l 1 is feasible, l 1(Kl 1 + 1) should o¤er her next best
contract. Take the second cadet making her next o¤er. Since cadet is rejected at step
Kl 1, by lemma 1, we can say that she has no accepted contract two steps before
her next o¤er and we can swap her turn with the one who o¤ered before her. By
doing this procedure one at a time, we can change her turn to Kl 1+2. Then we can
use the same technique to change o¤ering orders of other cadets in the set and make
them o¤er their next best contracts in steps between Kl 1 and Kl without changing
outcome. Let the new order of o¤ering be l.
If we continue untill we cover all steps in  and construct some order of o¤ering
L, it is easy to verify that L belongs to the class  and since we keep outcome
unchanged during the procedure, one can say that feasible order of o¤ering  gives
the same outcome as any order in class . Since we choose  arbitrarily, this result is
true for any feasible order. Hence, cumulative o¤er algorithm with any feasible order
gives one identical, stable allocation.
Proof of Proposition 3. For any given set of contracts Y such that
jYI j > q, top q(1   ) cadets will be accepted by both choice functions. Therefore,
(O(j; C 0(Y )I)) = (O(j; CUSMA(Y )I)), for j  q(1   ). For the rest of the slots
there are three cases possible:
Case 1: If all cadets in top q(1   ) have contracts with t0 in Y , then both
choice functions choose the same set of cadets, i.e. C 0(Y ) = CUSMA(Y ).
If there is at least one cadet in top q(1   ) who has no contract with t0 in
Y , then let Y 0 be the set of contracts of the remaining cadets and Y 0+ be the set of
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contracts in Y 0 with t+. If jY 0+j  q then CUSMA terminates the procedure in the
second phase and C 0 terminates the procedure in the rst phase.
Case 2.1: If jY 0+j  q and the constraint for the alternative choice function
never binds, then CUSMA chooses top q cadets who has a contract with t+ in Y 0,
i.e. O(q(1  ) + j; CUSMA(Y )I) = O(j; Y 0+I) for j = 1; : : : ; q and for the alternative
choice functionO(q(1 )+j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 0I ) for j = 1; : : : ; q. Since there is a set
inclusion between Y 0 and Y 0+, i.e. Y
0
+  Y 0, for the remaining slots alternative choice
function chooses better cadets. Therefore, (O(j; CUSMA(Y )I))  (O(j; C 0(Y )I))
for j = 1; : : : ; q.
Case 2.2: If jY 0+j  q and the constraint for the alternative choice function
binds in phase 1 when q(1  ) + j seats lled, then let Y 00+ be the set of remaining
contracts with t+. So we have O(q(1   ) + j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 0I ) for j = 1; : : : ; j
and O(q(1 )+j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 00+I) for j = j+1; : : : ; q. Since we have Y 0+  Y 0
and any high cost contract of cadets in the set
qS
j=j+1
O(j; Y 0+I) is available in Y 00+ ,
alternative choice function chooses at least as high ranked cadets as CUSMA for the
remaining seats. Therefore, (O(j; CUSMA(Y )I))  (O(j; C 0(Y )I)) for j = 1; : : : ; q.
Case 3.1: If jY 0+j < q and the constraint for the alternative choice function
never binds, then the alternative choice function chooses top q cadets in the set
Y 0I , i.e. O(q(1   ) + j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 0I ) for j = 1; : : : ; q. On the other hand,
CUSMA has a further constraint of choosing all the cadets in set Y 0+I . Therefore,
(O(j; CUSMA(Y )I))  (O(j; C 0(Y )I)) for j = 1; : : : ; q.
Case 3.2: If jY 0+j < q, the constraint for the alternative choice function binds
in phase 1 when q(1 )+j seats lled and the alternative choice function terminates
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the procedure in the rst phase, then we have O(q(1  ) + j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 0I ) for
j = 1; : : : ; j and O(q(1 )+ j; C 0(Y )I) = O(j; Y 00+I) for j = j+1; : : : ; q. Since set
of contracts Y  = C 0(Y ) \ Y 00+ is chosen under both choice functions and C 0 chooses
top q   jY j cadets among the remaining cadets we have (O(j; CUSMA(Y )I)) 
(O(j; C 0(Y )I)) for j = 1; : : : ; q.
Case 3.3: If jY 0+j < q, the constraint for the alternative choice function binds
in phase 1 when q(1 )+j seats lled and the alternative choice function terminates
the procedure in the third phase, set of contracts Y 00+ is chosen under both choice
functions and C 0 chooses top q jY 00+ j cadets among the remaining cadets. Therefore,
(O(j; CUSMA(Y )I))  (O(j; C 0(Y )I)) for j = 1; : : : ; q.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let x = (i; b; t) 2 Y  X be the only contract
in Y that involves cadet i and suppose x =2 Cb(Y ). Consider another contract z =2 Y
such that zI =2 YI . Let Y 0 = fx 2 X : xI =2
S
(1 )qb
fO(; YI)gg. We have two cases
to consider:
Case 1: t = t0. Since (i; b; t) =2 Cb(Y ), either we have
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI)g
therefore (Y [ fzg)  Y implies
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI [ fzIg)g
or we have
i =2 S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y g)g and
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y and (j) < (i)g [ fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 Y gj  qb
therefore (Y [ fzg)  Y implies
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i =2 S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 (Y [ fzgg)g and
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 (Y [ fzg) and (j) < (i)g [ fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 (Y [ fzg)gj  qb
as well. Hence x =2 Cb(Y [ fzg).
Case 2: t = t+. Since (i; b; t) =2 Cb(Y ), either we have
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI)g and
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y g)g *
S
qb
fO(; YI)g
or we have
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI)g,
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y g)g 
S
qb
fO(; YI)g and
jfj 2 In S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y g)g : (j; b; t+) 2 Y gj  qb
therefore (Y [ fzg)  Y implies either
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI [ fzIg)g and
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y [ fzgg)g *
S
qb
fO(; YI [ fzIg)g
or
i =2 S
qb
fO(; YI [ fzIg)g,
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y [ fzgg)g 
S
qb
fO(; YI [ fzIg)g and
jfj 2 In S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 Y [ fzgg)g : (j; b; t+) 2 Y [ fzggj  qb
as well. Hence x =2 Cb(Y [ fzg) for this case as well, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. For any sets of contracts Y  Y 0  X, let
C 0(Y 0)  Y  Y 0. Take a contract x 2 Y 0 such that x =2 C 0(Y 0). If owner of contract
x has no chosen contract, then removing x is not going to change chosen set since
contracts of higher ranked cadets are still available. If owner of contract x has a
chosen contract, say y, then since removing x has no e¤ect on choosing y and choice
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function never returns rejected contracts again removing x does not a¤ect chosen set.
Therefore, removing a rejected contract does not a¤ect chosen set.
Since, removing x does not change chosen set, removing rejected contracts one
at a time untill we reach set Y does not change chosen set which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. By the propositions 2 and 3 choice functions
of branches satisfy bilateral substitutes and IRC conditions. By Theorem 1 of Ay-
gun and Sonmez (2012b) cadet proposing cumulative o¤er algorithm produces stable
allocation.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, think about Cb1. For any hx; si = h(i; b0; t); si,
if b0 6= b or s = 2, then hx; si is not going to be chosen in ~Y or ~Y 0. Let hx; 1i =
h(i; b; t); si 2 ~Y  ~Y 0  ~X be a contract in ~Y and suppose x =2 Cb1( ~Y ). We have two
cases to consider:
Case 1: t = t0 or t = t+ and @ h(i; b; t0); 1i 2 ~Y . Since hx; 1i =2 Cb1( ~Y ), we have
i =2
[
qb1
fO(; ~YI)g
therefore ~Y 0  ~Y implies
i =2
[
qb1
fO(; ~Y 0I )g
Hence hx; 1i =2 Cb1( ~Y 0).
Case 2: t = t+ and 9 h(i; b; t0); 1i 2 ~Y . Since b1 always gives priority to low cost
contracts, h(i; b; t0); 1i 2 ~Y implies hx; 1i =2 Cb1( ~Y ). Therefore, h(i; b; t0); 1i 2 ~Y 0  ~Y
implies hx; 1i =2 Cb1( ~Y 0).
Hence hx; 1i =2 Cb1( ~Y 0) for this case as well, completing the proof.
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Now, consider Cb2 . For any hx; si = h(i; b0; t); si, if b0 6= b or s = 1, then hx; si
is not going to be chosen in ~Y or ~Y 0. Let hx; 2i = h(i; b; t); 2i 2 ~Y  ~Y 0  ~X be a
contract in ~Y and suppose x =2 Cb2( ~Y ). We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: t = t+. Since hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y ), we have
i =2
[
qb2
fO(; fj 2 I : h(j; b; t+); 2i 2 ~YIg)g
therefore ~Y 0  ~Y implies
i =2
[
qb2
fO(; fj 2 I : h(j; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y 0Ig)g
Hence hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y 0).
Case 2.1: t = t0 and 9 h(i; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y . Since b2 always gives priority to high
cost contracts, h(i; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y implies hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y ). Therefore, h(i; b; t+); 2i 2
~Y  ~Y 0 implies hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y 0).
Case 2.2: t = t0 and @ h(i; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y . Since hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y ), either we have
i =2
[
qb2
fO(; ~YI)g
therefore ~Y 0  ~Y implies
i =2
[
qb2
fO(; ~Y 0I )g
or
jfj 2 I : h(j; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y gj  qb2
therefore ~Y 0  ~Y implies
jfj 2 I : h(j; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y 0gj  qb2
as well. Hence hx; 2i =2 Cb2( ~Y 0) for this case as well, completing the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Both Cb1 and Cb2 are in the class of lexicographic
choice functions described in Kominers and Sonmez (2012). Therefore, Lemma 6 is
corollary of Lemma D.1 of Kominers and Sonmez (2012).
Proof of Lemma 6. For any set of contracts ~Y , if the number of cadets
who has at least one contract in ~Y is greater than or equal to branchs quota, both
choice functions ll all the seats. Therefore, adding more contract never decreases the
number of chosen contracts, since number of cadets never decreases. If the number of
cadets with at least one contract in ~Y is less than branchs quota, both choice functions
chooses one contract of each cadet. So, jCbj( ~Y )j = j ~YI j for j = 1; 2. Therefore, for any
~Y 0  ~Y and j = 1; 2, jCbj( ~Y )j < jCbj( ~Y 0)j if ~YI  ~Y 0I , jCbj( ~Y )j = jCbj( ~Y 0)j otherwise.
Hence, the number of chosen contracts never decreases if the set of available contracts
gets larger.
Proof of Proposition 7. First of all, for any cadet sub-branch matching
problem with (P i )i2I induced by (Pi)i2I , let the outcome of cadet proposing cumu-
lative o¤er algorithm be ~X 0. By theorem 1 in Aygun Sonmez (2013) and by theorem
3 and 4 in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) ~X 0 is a stable allocation which is weakly
preferred to any other stable allocation by all cadets.
We denote the outcome of the cumulative o¤er algorithm of original cadet-
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branch problem by X 0, and for any cadet i 2 X 0I , let
~xi =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
h(i; b; t0); 1i if (i; b; t0) 2 X 0 and i 2
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0g)g
h(i; b; t0); 2i if (i; b; t0) 2 X 0 and i =2
S
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0g)g
h(i; b; t+); 1i if (i; b; t+) 2 X 0 and i =2
S
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0g)g
h(i; b; t+); 2i if (i; b; t+) 2 X 0 and i 2
S
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0g)g
and let
~Y 0 =
[
i2X0I
f~xig.
By construction, we have $( ~Y 0) = X 0.
Now, rst we are going to show that ~Y 0 is a stable allocation in the cadet
sub-branch matching problem. Since X 0 is a stable allocation, ~xiP i ; for all cadets
and for any sub-branch, number of contracts does not exceed its quota. Therefore, ~Y 0
is individually rational and satises rst condition of stable allocations. Now assume
that there is a sub-branch bs and a set of contracts ~Y 00 6= Cbs( ~Y 0) such that
~Y 00 = Cbs( ~Y
0 [ ~Y 00)  CI( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00).
Therefore, there exist a contract hx; si = h(i; b; t); si 2 ~Y 00nCbs( ~Y 0) such that
hx; siP i ~Y 0i . If there exist a contract ~xi = h(i; b00 ; t0); s0i and b0 6= b or there is no
contract of cadet i in ~Y 0, then by the fact that X 0 is the outcome of cumulative o¤er
algorithm, we know that x is proposed in some step of cumulative o¤er algorithm and
is rejected by branch b in the nal step. So, we have four possible cases:
Case 1: If s = 1 and t = t0, then either we have
i =2
[
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : X 0(j) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g
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or we have
i =2
[
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g and
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0 and (j) < (i)g [ fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0gj  qb
by stability of X 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t0); 1i h(j; b; t+); 1ig \ ~Y 0 6= ; and (j) < (i)gj  (1  )qb = qb1
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, hx; si =2 Cb1( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property of
Cb1. A contradiction.
Case 2: If s = 2 and t = t0, then either we have
i =2
[
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : X 0(j) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g
or we have
i =2
[
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g and
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0 and (j) < (i)g [ fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0gj  qb
by stability of X 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t0); 2i h(j; b; t+); 2ig \ ~Y 0 6= ; and (j) < (i)gj  qb = qb2
or
jfj 2 I : h(j; b; t+); 2i 2 ~Y 0gj  qb = qb2
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, hx; si =2 Cb2( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property of
Cb2. A contradiction.
Case 3: If s = 1 and t = t+, then we have
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i =2 S
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : X 0(j) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g and
jX 0(b) \ fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0gj  (1  )qb
by stability of X 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t0); 1i h(j; b; t+); 1ig \ ~Y 0 6= ; and (j) < (i)gj  (1  )qb = qb1
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, hx; si =2 Cb1( ~Y 0[ ~Y 00) by substitutes property
of Cb1. A contradiction.
Case 4: If s = 2 and t = t+, then we have
i =2 S
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : X 0(j) 2 X 0(b)g [ fig)g and
jX 0(b) \ fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0gj  (1  )qb
by stability of X 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t+); 2ig 2 ~Y 0 and (j) < (i)gj  qb = qb2
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, hx; si =2 Cb2( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property
of Cb2. A contradiction. Hence if X
0
i = ; or b0 6= b, then there is no contract
hx; si = h(i; b; t); si 2 ~Y 00nCbs( ~Y 0) such that hx; si 2 Cbs( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00).
Now consider the case where b0 = b, s0 = s and t0 6= t. Since X 0 is the outcome
of cumulative o¤er algorithm, contract x is proposed in some step and rejected in the
nal step. Therefore, we have four cases to consider:
Case 1: If s = 1 and t = t0, then we have x =2 Cb(X 0 [ (x)) by IRC condition
and by stability of X 0. Therefore, we have
i =2
[
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0g [ fig)g,
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which implies
i 2
[
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0g)g =) ~xi = h(i; b; t+); 2i
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, h(i; b; t+); 1i =2 ~Y 0. A contradiction.
Case 2: If s = 1 and t = t+, then hx; si can not be chosen by b1, since b1 always
gives priority to low cost contracts among the contracts of same cadet. Therefore,
hx; si =2 Cb1( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property of Cb1 . A contradiction.
Case 3: If s = 2 and t = t0, then hx; si can not be chosen by b2, since b2 always
gives priority to high cost contracts among the contracts of same cadet. Therefore,
hx; si =2 Cb2( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property of Cb2. A contradiction.
Case 4: If s = 2 and t = t+, then we have x =2 Cb(X 0 [ (x)) by IRC condition
and by stability of X 0. Therefore, we have
i 2
[
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0g)g,
which implies
~xi = h(i; b; t+); 1i
by construction of ~Y 0. Therefore, h(i; b; t0); 2i =2 ~Y 0. A contradiction. Hence if b0 = b
and s0 = s, then there is no contract hx; si = h(i; b; t); si 2 ~Y 00nCbs( ~Y 0) such that
hx; si 2 Cbs( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00).
Now consider the case where b0 = b, t0 = t and s0 6= s. We have four cases to
consider:
Case 1: s = 1 and t = t0. We have
i =2
[
(1 )qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0g)g
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by construction of ~Y 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t0) 2 X 0 and (j) < (i)ggj  (1  )qb = qb1
=) jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t0); 1i h(j; b; t+); 1ig \ ~Y 0 6= ; and (j) < (i)gj  (1  )qb = qb1
by construction of ~Y 0. So, hx; si =2 Cb1( ~Y 0 [ fhx; sig). Therefore, hx; si =2
Cb1( ~Y
0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes property of Cb1. A contradiction.
Case 2: s = 1 and t = t+. By Individual rationality of X 0, we have
(i; b; t+)Pi; =) h(i; b; t+); 2iP i h(i; b; t+); 1i
by construction of P i . Therefore, hx; 2iP i hx; 1i. A contradiction.
Case 3: s = 2 and t = t0. By Individual rationality of X 0, we have
(i; b; t0)Pi; =) h(i; b; t0); 1iP i h(i; b; t0); 2i
by construction of P i . Therefore, hx; 1iP i hx; 2i. A contradiction.
Case 4: s = 2 and t = t+. We have
i =2
[
qb
fO(; fj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0g)g
by construction of ~Y 0, which implies
jfj 2 I : (j; b; t+) 2 X 0 and (j) < (i)gj  qb = qb2
=) jfj 2 I : fh(j; b; t+); 2ig \ ~Y 0 6= ; and
(j) < (i)gj  qb = qb2
So, hx; si =2 Cb2( ~Y 0 [ fhx; sig). Therefore, hx; si =2 Cb2( ~Y 0 [ ~Y 00) by substitutes
property of Cb2. A contradiction. Hence, ~Y
0 is a stable allocation in the cadet sub-
branch problem.
It su¢ ces to show that no contract z = (i; b; t) 2 $( ~X 0) is ever rejected during
the cumulative o¤er process. To see this, we suppose the contrary, and consider the
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rst step k at which some contract z 2 $( ~X 0) is rejected. We let s 2 f1; 2g be
the sub-branch such that hz; si 2 ~X 0, and let x 2 Cb(A(k)) be one of the contracts
assigned to b in step k. Now, as z is the rst contract in $( ~X 0) to be rejected, we
know that for all x 2 Cb(A(k)), xRxI ($( ~X 0))(xI) and jCb(A(k))j = qb.
First, assume that 9z0 2 Cb(A(k)) such that z0I = zI . By IRC property of Cb,
we know that (k) 6= zI . So, we have z 2 Cb(A(k   1)). Next, since z; z0 2 A(k)
and z 2 Cb(A(k   1)), we must have z0T = t+. Otherwise, we have jfy 2 A(k   1) :
yT = t0 and (yI) < (zI)gj  (1   )qb, which implies jfy 2 A(k) : yT = t0 and
(yI) < (zI)gj  (1   )qb and z0 =2 Cb(A(k)). Let k0 < k   1 be the step which
z0 is rejected for the rst time. So, we have z0I =2
S
qb
fO(; (A(k0))I)g, which implies
zI =2
S
qb
fO(; (A(k   1))I)g and z =2 Cb(A(k   1)), a contradiction. Therefore, there
is no z0 2 Cb(A(k)) such that z0I = zI .
Now, assume that @z0 2 Cb(A(k)) such that z0I = zI . Therefore , as z =2
Cb(A(k)), for all x 2 Cb(A(k)) we have on of the four cases
Case 1 xT = t0; zT = t0 then (xI) < (zI)
Case 2 xT = t+; zT = t+ then (xI) < (zI)
Case 3 xT = t+; zT = t0 then either (xI) < (zI) or jfy 2 Cb(A(k)) : yT = t+gj  qb
Case 4 xT = t0; zT = t+ then (xI) < (zI) and jfy 2 Cb(A(k)) : yT = t+gj  qb.
If for any x 2 Cb(A(k)), we have x 6= ($( ~X 0))(xI), then we must have
xPxI ($(
~X 0))(xI). In addition to this, if we have case 1 or case 2 then (fhx; sig [
~X 0)nf ~X 0(xI)g blocks ~X 0. If we have case 3, then we must have jfy 2 Cb(A(k)) : yT = t0
and (yI) < (zI)gj  (1   )qb. In that case, if x 6= ($( ~X 0))(xI) and hz; si 2 ~X 0,
then we have either s = 1 and there exists a contract y 2 Cb(A(k)) such that
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yT = t0, (yI) < (zI) and hy; 1i =2 ~X 0, or s = 2. If the former happens then
(fhy; 1ig [ ~X 0)nf ~X 0(yI)g blocks ~X 0 since b1 gives priority to higher ranked cadets
and hy; 1iP yI hy; 2iP yI ~X 0(yI). If the latter happens then (fhx; 2ig [ ~X 0)nf ~X 0(xI)g
blocks ~X 0 since b2 gives priority to high cost contracts. If we have case 4, then we
must have jfy 2 Cb(A(k)) : yT = t+ and (yI) < (zI)gj  qb. In that case, if
x 6= ($( ~X 0))(xI) and hz; si 2 ~X 0, then we have either s = 2 and there exists a con-
tract y 2 Cb(A(k)) such that yT = t+, (yI) < (zI) and hy; 2i =2 ~X 0, or s = 1. If
the former happens then (fhy; 2ig [ ~X 0)nf ~X 0(yI)g blocks ~X 0 since b2 gives priority to
higher ranked cadets among high cost contracts and hy; 2iP yI hy; 1iP yI ~X 0(yI). If the
latter happens then (fhx; 1ig[ ~X 0)nf ~X 0(xI)g blocks ~Z since b1 gives priority to higher
ranked cadets. Therefore, x = ($( ~Z))(xI) for all cases. Finally, since jCb(A(k))j = qb
and qb1 + qb2 = qb, we must have z =2 ~X 0, a contradiction, which means no contract
z 2 $( ~X 0) is ever rejected during the cumulative o¤er process. Therefore, for all
cadets ~Y 0Ri ~X
0. Hence, ~X 0 = ~Y 0 and $( ~X 0) = X 0.
Proof of Theorem 5. The two choice functions dened for b1 and b2 are in
the class of lexicographic choice functions described in Kominers and Sonmez (2012).
Therefore, for any cadet sub-branch matching problem, cadet proposing cumulative
o¤er algorithm is strategy-proof. Also, for any cadet and any given strategy prole
chosen by the others in our original cadet branch matching problem, all the possible
outcomes by choosing alternative strategies are achievable in the cadet sub-branch
matching problem. Since for the cadet sub-branch matching problem, cadet proposing
cumulative o¤er algorithm is strategy-proof, it would be weakly dominant strategy to
submit actual preferences. Therefore no alternative strategy in the original problem
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makes cadet strictly better o¤. Hence, COSM induced by alternative choice function
C 0() is strategy-proof.
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CHAPTER 3.
COLLEGE ADMISSION WITH MULTIDIMENSIONAL
PRIVILEGES: THE BRAZILIAN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION CASE
3.1 Introduction
A¢ rmative action policies in societies with heterogeneous populations are in-
creasingly popular and are often considered necessary for equalizing opportunities for
certain demographic groups. The United States and Brazil are examples of countries
with greatly heterogeneous populations in terms of wealth and racial backgrounds.
One way to mitigate the problem of inequality between individuals who belong to
di¤erent racial or gender groups or come from families with di¤erent income levels is
through a¢ rmative action. A¢ rmative action is a method of positive discrimination
in favor of a certain groups of people to close socioeconomic gaps that exist between
di¤erent groups as a result of historic discriminatory practices. This paper studies
a¢ rmative action in college admission in Brazil where the goal is to give underrepre-
sented groups increased chances of attending better universities.
The Brazilian federal higher education system comprises of 59 universities and
38 institutes of education, science and technology, with an annual inow of about
one million students to its undergraduate programs. Following an increasing role for
a¢ rmative action for students of African descent and of low-income families in terms
of access to public universities1, the Brazilian congress enacted in August 2012 a law
1For detailed information about history of a¢ rmative action in Brazil, check Moehlecke (2003).
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establishing the implementation of a series of a¢ rmative action policies throughout
said system.
The law established that 50% of the seats in each program o¤ered in those
institutions2 should be used for the a¢ rmative action policies. In order to claim
the privilege of having higher priority in the access to those seats, a student must
complete the three years of high-school in a public institution (being it local, state or
federal). When assigning students to at least 50% of those seats, the university must
also give higher priority to students who claim the privilege associated with being low-
income (and give documentation proving such status as dened in law.) Additionally,
when assigning a number of seats in the same proportion of the aggregate number
of blacks, browns and indians (here referred to as minorities) in the state in which
the institution is, the university should give higher priority to students who claim
the privilege associated with being a minority. We will throughout this chapter talk
in terms of seats giving higher priority to students who claim some privileges, and
denote those as public HS privilege, low-income privilegeand minority
privilege.
In a state where minorities constitute 25% of the population, for example, a
program with capacity of 80 will have 40 seats giving higher priority for students
claiming public HS privilege. At least 20 of those should give higher priority for those
claiming low-income privilege, and 10 for those claiming minority privilege.
In October of the same year, Brazils Ministry of Education published an
2In Brazil, like in the Turkish system studied in Balinski and Sonmez (1999), students apply
directly to a specic program in the university, di¤erently from other countries like the US where
students simply apply to the university and once there chooses majors or programs to pursuit.
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ordinance specifying some details on the implementation of the a¢ rmative action law
as well as a suggested mechanism for choosing students while satisfying those policies.
Starting in the student selection processes of 2013, based on our observations, those
recommendations were widely adopted as the new selection criteria.
The key distinctive issue presented by the privileges proposed in the law is
the fact that they are multidimensional. That is, students may belong to one or
more of the groups specied. For instance, a low-income white student from public
high school qualies for the low-income privilege but not for the minority privilege.
Although the literature for a¢ rmative action from a mechanism design perspective
has seen many important contributions, as in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003),
Westkamp (2013) and Hafalir et al. (2013), to the best of our knowledge none of
them are able to respond to the challenge introduced by these types of privileges.
Another unique aspect of this case is that students are not obligated to apply
to the universities using any of the privileges for a¢ rmative action to groups to
which they belong. This is due to the fact that being selected through the a¢ rmative
action policies is an opt-inprocedure, that is, those students who are object of those
privileges may choose not to be selected through that special criterion. Therefore,
some students may choose to hidewhether they belong to some of the three groups
mentioned above, depending on the mechanism used for the assignments.
Starting in 2010, a new centralized system3 was put in place to match students
to federal universities. Although the study of the characteristics of that system is
outside of the scope of this paper, the problems identied here are still present in
3The Unied System of Selection, denoted SISU.
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it, and moreover it shows that there is a tendency for centralization of that process.
Methods that could improve upon the current system in a centralized way (as the one
that we present in this chapter,) may therefore have a direct application and impact.
The problem of allocating indivisible goods in the absence of money is studied
in many papers, starting from the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). They
study a college admissions market where students have preferences over colleges and
colleges have preferences over sets of students to be admitted. The market clearing
condition that they dened, stability, is still in use (sometimes with variations) and
considered as one of the most important goals that mechanism designers consider for
matching problems. They also introduce the celebrated student-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (DA) to nd a stable allocation. The DA mechanism is also
utilized in many applied and theoretical papers in the matching literature. The
centralized algorithm we suggest in this paper, the cumulative o¤er algorithm, is also
a variation of the DA algorithm.
The school choice with a¢ rmative action problem consists of two parts. The
rst part is the schools criteria for choosing students, which we denote a choice
function. A choice function provides a set of students that are selected for any possible
set of students that apply for a given school. The second part is the algorithm that
the central authority uses to allocate school seats to students using the schoolschoice
functions.
The rst approach to this problem from a mechanism design perspective is
the work of Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003). They analyze the system in Boston
(denoted Boston Mechanism), which gave students higher priorities in schools in their
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neighborhoods or in schools in which students have a sibling already attending. By
giving these priorities, the Boston Mechanism positively discriminates some students
for certain schools. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) propose two algorithms, DA
and top trading cycles (TTC), as alternatives for the Boston school choice algorithm,
while keeping priorities of the schools as given. They show that the DA yield out-
comes that are stable and e¢ cient from the studentsperspective. Also, DA is not
manipulable, i.e. no student can manipulate their preferences and obtain a better
school assignment. Subsequently, Abdulkadiroglu (2005) considers the college admis-
sion problem with a¢ rmative action policy, and shows su¢ cient conditions on the
schoolspreferences to recover the properties of the DA algorithm.
In a recent paper, Westkamp (2013) studies the German university admission
system in which reserved seats are transferred to di¤erent subpopulations in case of
lack of applications. In this matching with complex constraints problem, the author
species a method for schools to choose sets of students in any given case and designs
a mechanism that gives a stable allocation under these circumstances. In another
recent paper, Kamada and Kojima (2012) study the Japanese Residency Matching
Program, where there are quotas for regions in order to help rural regions attract
more residents. In the mechanism they study, the government sets a target capacity
for each hospital to implement these quotas. They show that using target capacities
may result in ine¢ ciencies and that violating these targets may improve over the
ine¢ ciencies.
In 2012, Kojima showed that in a¢ rmative action problems with two groups
(majorities and minorities), using maximum quotas (that is, a maximum number of
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students for some types) for even one side may be ine¢ cient and hurt all members
of the minority group the group which the policy intends to help. In a subsequent
paper, Hafalir et al. (2013) study the school choice problems with a¢ rmative action
for minorities. They show the deciencies of utilizing maximum quotas for school
choice problems with a¢ rmative action: welfare losses and wasted seats. Switching
the system to DA with minority reserves instead solves the problem of wasted seats
and signi¢ cantly improves studentswelfare.
Our model is built upon the matching with contracts model described by Hat-
eld and Milgrom (2005). Hateld and Milgrom (2005) connect the matching problem
of indivisible goods and the labor market model. They show that the foundations
of a labor market model where workers can be hired by many alternative contracts
(Kelso and Crawford, 1982) are also achievable in matching markets. This paper
is very important because it not only subsumes and unies these two problems but
also relates the DA algorithm with xed point techniques in lattice theory. In our
problem, students do not have to declare their true demographic status through the
privileges that they claim, i.e. a minority student can be admitted as a non-minority
student. Hence, as in a matching with contracts problem, students can be admitted
in di¤erent ways to schools.
The remaning of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we present
the mechanism suggested by the Ministry of Education and currently used by the
universities surveyed. In section 3, we introduce the matching with contracts model
that we apply to the school choice problem with a¢ rmative action. In section 4,
we introduce the Multidimensional Brazil Privileges Choice Function and we build
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upon the choice function dened to describe a mechanism Student Optimal Stable
Mechanism that matches students to colleges in a centralized way, satises stabil-
ity, is strategy-proof and fair. In section 5, we show that even for a single college,
the currently used Brazil Reserves Choice Function induces a game with multiple
Nash Equilibria in which strategically sophisticated students may obtain advantage
by strategizing over the privileges that they claim. We also show that the current
mechanism is not fair and cannot guarantee the satisfaction of the a¢ rmative action
objectives when they are feasible. In section 6, we conclude. All the proofs are given
in the Appendix section.
3.2 Brazilian Reserves Choice Function
For the most part, until 2010, college admissions in Brazil worked essentially
in a decentralized way. Students applied for a single program in each university that
they desire to (Ex: History at University of Brasilia or Biology at Federal University
of Minas Gerais). By using some combination of scores in a national exam and
sometimes exams particular to those programs, the universities ranked them and
accepted the top applicants to each program up to the programscapacities, putting
the remaining ones in waiting lists.
Among those accepted, typically some would not enroll because they were also
accepted by other universities and courses of their preference. The universities would
then proceed to a second round, accepting students from the waitlist following their
ranking. Depending on the university this might be followed by third and fourth
rounds.
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The introduction of the reserves law has not changed the decentralized nature
of the system yet. But the centralized online system used for some universities gives
a strong signal that o¢ cials in charge of college admissions in Brazil are open to
utilize a centralized method, which is shown in many papers to improve e¢ ciency
and reduce wasted seats in colleges. On the other hand, the a¢ rmative action law
changed the choice rules of universities in each step in an attempt to satisfy the
a¢ rmative action objectives. The rules used by the universities surveyed in this work
are, essentially, strict implementations (or small variations) of the one suggested by
Brazils Ministry of Education. This rule tells the set of students to be chosen from
any set of applicants and will be denoted as the class of Brazil Reserves Choice
Function (BRCF). It suggests that the seats for each program should be split into
ve subsets. For any program with capacity Q, the ve distinct subsets are:
 A set Qmi with dQ4 rme seats which give priority to students who claim public
HS, minority and low-income privileges,
 A set QMi with dQ4 (1   rm)e seats which give priority to students who claim
public HS and low-income privileges only,
 A set QmI with dQ4 rme seats which give priority to students who claim public
HS and minority privileges only,
 A set QMI with dQ4 (1   rm)e seats which give priority to students who claim
public HS privilege only,
 A set Q  with the remaining seats.
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where rm is the ratio of minorities in the state where that program (college)
is located.
Given the students who apply for each of those, the ones better ranked on
the entrance exam are accepted up to the capacity of the set. If there are enough
applicants for each of those sets, the a¢ rmative action objectives, as described by the
law, are satised. In case the number of students who apply for some of those sets
is smaller than their capacity, those seats are lled following the priority structure
below:
 If there are seats available in Qmi, those are made available:
 to students claiming low-income and public HS privileges only, then
 to students claiming minority and public HS privileges only, then
 to students claiming public HS privileges only, then
 to any student
 If there are seats available in QMi, those are made available:
 to students claiming low-income, minority and public HS privileges, then
 to students claiming minority and public HS privileges only, then
 to students claiming HS privilege only, then
 to any student
 If there are seats available in QmI , those are made available:
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 to students claiming public HS privilege only, then
 to students claiming low-income, minority and public HS privileges, then
 to students claiming low-income and public HS privileges only, then
 to any student
 If there are seats available in QMI , those are made available:
 to students claiming minority and public HS privileges only, then
 to students claiming low-income, minority and public HS privileges, then
 to students claiming low-income and public HS privileges only, then
 to any student
It is not specied, however, in which order those seats are lled following those
priorities4.
3.3 The Model
We are dealing with a student-program matching problem where programs
have complex privileges structures and students have more than one way to attend
a program. Due to those characteristics of the problem we will use the matching
with contracts model. There are nite sets S = fs1; : : : ; sng and P = fp1; : : : ; pmg
of students and programs. The set SP  S contains all students in S from public
high-schools, Sm  SP contains the racial minority students from public schools and
4In section 5 we present two actual implementations being used by universities surveyed, clarifying
the order in which those seats are lled.
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Si  SP contains the low-income students from public schools. Each program p has
its own capacity level Qp and minority reserve ratio rmp . Each student s has a vector of
exam scores z(s) = (zp1(s); : : : ; zpm(s)) such that zp(s) indicates the score of student
s for program p. For any two students s and s0, zp(s) and zp(s0) are assumed to be
di¤erent, that is, 8s; s0 2 S and p 2 P , zp(s) = zp(s0) () s = s0. Each student
s has a vector of available privileges she can claim, ts = (tPs ; t
m
s ; t
i
s) where t
P
s ; t
m
s ; t
i
s
represents public HS, minority and low-income privileges, respectively. Each element
of ts is binary and 1 means student is eligibile for the privilege and 0 means she is not
eligible. For example, if a student is a low-income non-minority student from public
high school, then ts = (1; 0; 1). In the Brazilian system, if a student claims public
HS, minority or low-income privileges she is required to prove those classications.
Therefore, some students may opt not to claim a privilege associated to a group she
belongs to, but students who dont belong to a group (and therefore cant prove
belonging to it) are unable to claim that privilege.
Throughout this section we will make use of the matching with contracts no-
tation. A contract x, in this context, is a tuple (s; p; t), where s 2 S, p 2 P and
t = (tP ; tm; ti)  ts. Vector t represents the set of privileges student claims and
tP ; tm; ti are binary and represents public HS, minority and low-income privileges she
claims, respectively. For a contract x; xS, xP and xT represent student, program and
set of privileges s claims in contract x respectively. Let X be the set of all contracts.
For ease of notation, for a set of contracts Y , Yi is the subset of Y that contains
only the contracts that include i 2 S [P . Let s(Y ), moreover, be the set of students
with contracts in Y , that is, s(Y ) = fs 2 S : 9(s; p; t) 2 Y g. An allocation is a
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set of contracts X 0  X, such that for every s 2 S and every p 2 P , jX 0sj  1 and
jX 0pj  Qp. Let  be the set of all possible allocations.
The null contract, meaning that the student has no contract, is denoted by
;. Students have complete preferences, , over her contracts and the null contract,
Xs [ ;. These preferences are derived from students strict preferences, , over
programs and being unmatched, in addition to the fact that they consider irrelevant
how they are accepted to a program:
8s 2 S;8p; p0 2 P and t; t0  ts : (s; p; t) s (s; p0; t0) () p s p0
Next, the choice function of program p, Cp : 2X ! 2X is a function that
chooses, that is, for Y  X, Cp(Y )  Yp , Cp(Y ) has cardinality at most Qp and has
at most one contract for each student. The assumption about student preferences we
mentioned above is one of the main di¤erences of our paper with the current matching
with contracts literature, since our model allows indi¤erences among contracts, in
contrast with the usual assumption of strict preferences found in the literature so
far. Due to indi¤erences students have between some contracts, we cannot derive
choice functions of students as dened in the many to one matching with contracts
models. As a result, instead of choice functions for students, we are going to use
student preferences. Therefore, primitives of our model are student preferences over
contracts and programschoice functions.
A mechanism is a strategy space s for each student s along with an outcome
function  :
Y
s2S
s !  that selects an allocation for each strategy vector
Y
s2S
s 2Y
s2S
s. Given a student s and a strategy prole s 2 s, let  s denote the strategy
81
of all students except student s.
3.4 Student Optimal Stable Mechanism
The Multidimensional Brazil Privileges Choice Function One of our objectives is to
nd a choice function that satises the a¢ rmative action objectives for each program,
removes incentives for students to strategize over the privileges that they claim and
guarantees the existence of a stable allocation. We also aim to design a mechanism
that carries out our choice functions properties and nds a stable allocation.
We are proposing a new choice function, Multidimensional Brazil Privileges
Choice Function (or MCF), in order to allocate students to seats in programs. Unlike
the BRCF, our choice function CMCF obtains the desired incentive characteristics
by giving priority in a seat to any student who can claim the privileges associated
with that seat. Also, by doing this, the choice function satises another important
criterion: fairness.
Let qp be the number of seats associated with students who claim low-income,
minority and public HS in the BRCF, for program p. For any given set of contracts
X, the algorithm which implements the choice function CMCF is the following:
Phase 0: Program p rejects each contract that does not include itself (xP 6=
p =) x =2 Cp(X)).
Phase 1: Program p considers only contracts with xT = (1; 1; 1). Program
p accepts contracts including students with the highest scores zp one at a time and
continues until either all contracts are considered or qp contracts are chosen. In any
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case, program proceeds with Phase 2. Let  be qp jfcontracts accepted in Phase1gj.
Phase 2: Program p considers remaining contracts with xT > (1; 0; 0). Pro-
gram p accepts contracts including students with highest scores zp one at a time.
During the process, if constraint (1) or (2) below binds, program p tentatively rejects
all the remaining contracts with the relevant vector of privileges. Then, the program
continues accepting contracts one by one following the order of student scores. Phase
2 ends if all contracts are considered or rmp
Qp
2
+ Qp
4
  qp contracts are accepted. Then,
the program proceeds with Phase 3.
Possible constraints to bind Rel. vectors of priv.
jfContracts accepted with xT = (1; 0; 1)gj  Qp4 +    qp t = (1; 0; 1) (1)
jfContracts accepted with xT = (1; 1; 0)gj  rmp Qp2 +    qp t = (1; 1; 0) (2)
Phase 3: In this phase, the program considers all tentatively rejected contracts
and all the remaining contracts with xT  (1; 0; 0). Program p accepts contracts
including students with highest scores zp, one at a time. The program continues until
either all contracts are considered or Qp
2
students are chosen. In any case, it proceeds
to Phase 4.
Phase 4: In this phase, the program considers all the remaining contracts.
Program p accepts contracts including students with highest scores zp, one at a time.
It continues until either all contracts are considered or QP students are chosen. Then
program terminates the procedure and rejects all the remaining contracts, if there are
any.
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Stability As in Gale and Shapley (1962) and most of the matching literature, we
are interested in stable allocations. Intuitively, an allocation is stable if students or
programs cannot improve upon the chosen allocation by either walking away from it
or by bilaterally making arrangements outside of the allocation.
Denition 16 An allocation X 0 is stable if
i: for all s 2 S and for all p 2 P , X 0s s ; , Cp(X 0) = X 0p; and
ii: @(p; s) 2 P  S, and contract x 2 X nX 0, such that
x 2 Cp((X 0 nX 0s) [ fxg); x s X 0s.
One can see that if students have strict preferences over contracts then our
stability denition and the one used in the current literature would be equivalent. In
order to show the existence of a stable allocation, we use the substitutes and law of
aggregate demand properties dened in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and irrelevance
of rejected contracts dened in Aygün and Sönmez (2013).
Substitutes, IRC, Law of Aggregate Demand and the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism
In this section, we dene the properties which are su¢ cient for existence of a stable
allocation in our college admission problem and show that CMCF () has these proper-
ties.
Denition 17 Elements of X are substitutes for program p if for all Y 0  Y 00  X
we have x 2 Y 0 n Cp(Y 0) =) x 2 Y 00 n Cp(Y 00).
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The substitutes condition simply states that if a contract x is rejected, not
chosen, in a set of contracts Y 0 then adding any other contract to Y 0 cannot make x
desirable or x should remain rejected in bigger sets that contain Y 0.
Lemma 7 Elements of X are substitutes for each program p under the choice func-
tion CMCF .
Denition 18 A choice function C satises the Law of Aggregate Demand if
for all Y 0  Y 00  X we have jC(Y 0)j  jC(Y 00)j.
Under the law of aggregate demand, when more contracts are added to a set
of contracts, the size of the chosen set never shrinks. Since, in any phase of the
choice function unlled seats are transferred to the next phases, and any student is
acceptable to programs, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The choice function CMCF satises the Law of Aggregate Demand, as
dened for each program p.
For many to one matching problems that use choice functions of programs as
a primitive, Aygün and Sönmez (2013) show that the substitutes condition is not
su¢ cient to guarantee existence of stable allocations. Therefore, since our primitive
of the model for programs is choice functions rather than preferences, we use the
Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts5 condition dened by Aygün and Sönmez (2013)
along with the substitutes condition.
5The Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts condition was previously dened as Consistency in
Alkan and Gale (2001).
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Denition 19 Given a set of contracts X, a choice function C satises the Irrel-
evance of Rejected Contracts (IRC) condition if
8Y  X;8x 2 X n Y x =2 C(Y [ fxg) =) C(Y ) = C(Y [ fxg).
The IRC condition simply states that an outcome of the choice function should
not be a¤ected by the removal of rejected contracts. With the help of this condition,
Aygün and Sönmez (2013) show that we can guarantee the existence of stable allo-
cation without the need for strict preferences of programs over sets of contracts.
Lemma 9 The choice function CMCF satises Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts for
each program p.
Finally, with the help of the conditions above, we can guarantee the existence
of a stable allocation for our student-program matching problem.
Proposition 8 If all programs use CMCF , the set of stable allocations for student-
program matching problem is not empty.
The choice function dened above denes only how a single school should
behave for a given set of students. Now, with the help of that choice function, we are
ready to introduce the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism,  SOSM . First, students
submit a vector of privileges they want to claim and preferences . We then use
the student proposing cumulative o¤er algorithm with submitted vector of privileges
(ts)s2S, preferences  and CMCF for each program. The cumulative o¤er algorithm
description we use here was previously introduced by Hateld and Kojima (2010).
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Step 1: One randomly selected student s1 o¤ers her rst choice contract x1
with the vector of privileges (ts1), according to her preferences s1. The program
that receives the o¤er, p1 = x1P , holds the contract. Let Ap1(1) = x
1, and Ap(1) = ;
for all p 6= p1.
In general,
Step k  2: One of the students for whom no contract is currently held by
a program, say sk, o¤ers the most preferred contract with the vector of privileges
(tsk), according to her preferences sk , that has not been rejected in previous steps.
Call the new o¤ered contract, xk. Let pk = xkP hold Cpk(Apk(k   1) [ fxkg) and
reject all other contracts in Apk(k   1) [ fxkg . Let Apk(k) = Apk(k   1) [ fxkg, and
Ap(k) = Ap(k   1) for all p 6= pk.
The algorithm terminates when either every student is matched to a program or
every unmatched student has no contract left with the vector of privileges they submit
to o¤er. The algorithm terminates in some nite number K of steps due to a nite
number of contracts. At that point, the algorithm produces X 0 =
[
p2P
Cp(Ap(K)), i.e.,
the set of contracts that are held by some program at the terminal step K.
We have already shown that the set of stable allocations is not empty if the
choice functions satisfy the substitutes condition. Our result below shows that the
student optimal stable mechanism gives us a stable allocation which is one of the
main desired properties of a mechanism in the matching literature.
Proposition 9 The Student Optimal Stable Mechanism,  SOSM , produces a stable
allocation for any given problem.
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Privilege Monotonicity, Fairness and A¢ rmative Action Objectives An ideal choice
function should also satisfy Privilege Monotonicity and fairness. Privilege Monotonic-
ity suggests that when a student applies to a program, claiming an additional privilege
should not decrease her chance to be chosen. With this property, we can state that
for any school, students do not have to gather information and strategize their ap-
plication processes with respect to those privileges. Hence, we can level the playing
eld for students.
Denition 20 Given a set of contracts X, a choice function C : 2X ! 2X is Priv-
ilege Monotonic if for any given set of contracts Y  X, and any student s with
no contract in Y ,
(s; p; ts) =2 Cp(Y [ f(s; p; ts)g) =) (s; p; t0) =2 Cp(Y [ f(s; p; t0)g);8t0  ts.
Proposition 10 The choice function CMCF is Privilege Monotonic.
Unlike the BRCF, the choice function we design gives students no incentive to
leave a privilege, associate to a group she belongs to, unclaimed. This property will
have an important role in the strategic properties of the mechanism we suggest.
Denition 21 Given a set of contracts X, a choice function C : 2X ! 2X is fair
if for any given subset Y  X, any program p and x 2 Yp,
x =2 Cp(Y ) =) 8y 2 C(Y ); either zp(yS) > zp(xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
Fairness of the choice function as we use here indicates that, if a contract is
not chosen this means that chosen contracts either include students with higher test
scores or they are chosen due to the a¢ rmative action policy.
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Proposition 11 The choice function CMCF is fair.
The new law issued in Brazil requires some structure on the sets chosen by
programs, with respect to the groups to which the students belong to. In other
words, the ratios associated with public HS, low-income and minorities should be,
when possible, satised by the students chosen for each program. We formalize this
in the denition below.
Denition 22 A choice function Cp : 2X ! 2X satises the a¢ rmative action
objectives at program p if 8Y  X:
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 0)gj  minfQp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 0)gjg;
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 1)gj  minfQp
4
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 1)gjg;
and jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 1; 0)gj  minf
rmp Qp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 1; 0)gjg.
The denition above states that a choice function must choose a su¢ cient
number of students from all groups of students that are subject to a¢ rmative action,
whenever it is possible. One can check that when qp = 0 our choice function satises
the a¢ rmative action objectives. However, when qp = 0 and rmp =
1
2
, all the seats that
give priority for those who claim public HS privilege will be reserved only for those
who also claim low-income and/or minority privileges. In this case, those who claim
only public HS privilege will in practice not have any privilege unless there are not
enough applications from those claiming the other combinations of privileges. Also,
students claiming all privileges may not enjoy this advantage unless their scores are
high enough compared to those claiming only two. The current guidelines set by the
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Brazilian government give priority to students claiming only public HS privilege for
some seats. Due to this fact, one can argue that there is an implicit objective that
programs should give priority to all combination of privileges which include public HS
for some seats. Since giving priority to each group may cause incentive problems, our
choice function, as a second best, prioritizes seats to students who claim each such
combination of privileges along with all students who claim some subset of them. For
a given program p, let qp be the number of seats associated with students who claim
low-income, minority and public HS in the BRCF. Therefore, if a program p, receives
at least qp contracts with the vector of privileges (1; 1; 1), the program should accept
at least qp contracts with the vector of privileges (1; 1; 1). Otherwise, the program
should accept all contracts available with the vector of privileges (1; 1; 1).
Denition 23 A choice function Cp : 2X ! 2X satises the a¢ rmative action
objectives conditional on qp at program p if 8Y  X:
jfx 2 Y : xT = (1; 1; 1)gj  qp implies
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 0)gj  minfQp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 0)gjg;
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 1)gj  minfQp
4
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 1)gjg;
and jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 1; 0)gj  minf
rmp Qp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 1; 0)gjg.
This second version includes a condition on the number of contracts claiming all
privileges. This conditional satisfaction of the a¢ rmative action objectives requires
satisfying them only in situations where we have enough applications claiming all
three privileges, as well as requiring that the satisfaction of all a¢ rmative action
objectives is possible.
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Proposition 12 The choice function CMCF satises the a¢ rmative action objec-
tives conditional on qp at any program p.
Although depending on the set of contracts available CMCF may not choose a
set of contracts that satises the a¢ rmative action objectives, qp can be determined
di¤erently for di¤erent programs. While programs that set low qp minimize the num-
ber of cases that fail to give enough seats to students claiming certain combinations of
privileges, programs that set a higher value for qp give more opportunity to students
who claim only the public HS privilege. One possible way for setting qp is to construct
an expected number of applications claiming all three privileges based on past years
applications.
Incentives and Fairness of the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism Although we have
shown that the choice function that we proposed satises the desired fairness and
incentives properties, we are also interested in knowing whether corresponding prop-
erties are satised by the overall allocation when the SOSM mechanism is used to
match students to programs. The rst such property that we introduce is that of
fairness.
Denition 24 An allocation X 0 is fair if for any given pair of contracts x; y 2 X 0
yP xS xP =) either zyP (yS) > zyP (xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
A mechanism is fair if for any given problem it chooses a fair allocation.
91
In the previous school choice and student placement literature, like for example
in Balinski and Sönmez (1999), it is shown that stability is su¢ cient for the allocation
to satisfy a fairness condition based on the priorities that students have at the schools.
This idea comes from the fairness of the responsive preferences of schools. As opposed
to the previous school choice and student placement literature, programs in our model
do not have responsive preferences. The non existence of responsive preferences may
result in allocations that are not fair as in Balinski and Sönmez (1999). Therefore,
in our problem, the stability of the mechanism is not su¢ cient for fairness. That is
the reason why the fairness satised by our mechanism comes from the fairness of the
choice function.
Proposition 13 The Student Optimal Stable Mechanism,  SOSM , is fair.
The next property that we discuss here is the incentive compatibility of the
mechanism, which is a desired characteristic in mechanism design. Incentive compat-
ibility in this context can be described as a property that guarantees that students
cannot be better-o¤ by strategizing over manipulations of the preferences being sub-
mitted or privileges being claimed. In our problem, studentsstrategy spaces do not
consist only of preferences over schools but also the privileges claimed. Although it
is tempting to conclude that the incentive compatibility of the SOSM immediately
follows as a corollary of the well-known incentive properties of the SOSM mechanism,
due to the wider strategy space for students the result must be obtained explicitly.
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Denition 25 A mechanism is incentive compatible if
@s 2 S;  s 2
Y
j2Snfsg
j; (ts;s); 0 2 s; such that  (0;  s) s  ((ts;s);  s).
In other words, for any student that we consider, no matter what her true
preferences are or which groups she belongs to, it will be in her best interest to reveal
her true preferences and claim all privileges that shes eligible to. This is valid for
any allocation problem and any strategies other students report.
Proposition 14 The Student Optimal Stable Mechanism,  SOSM , is incentive com-
patible.
3.5 Current Mechanism Revisited
So far, we introduced some desired properties that a choice function and a
mechanism should satisfy. In this section, rst we formally describe two of the choice
functions which are implementations of the guidelines published by the Ministry of
Education and currently used by two of the largest federal universities in Brazil. Next,
we show some deciencies of those choice functions and any stable mechanism that
uses these choice functions.
Two Examples of the BRCF Since the specication given by the guideline allows for
di¤erent choice procedures, we can nd variation on the universitiesimplementation
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of it. We will describe two instances: the choice function used by the Federal Uni-
versity of Minas Gerais (UFMG) and by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
(UFRGS) .
The implementations by UFMG and UFRGS are in the class of choice functions
described in Westkamp (2013) and Kominers and Sonmez (2012). This relationship
is helpful to analyze our properties.
As we mentioned in section 2, for any program, seats are partitioned into ve:
Qmi, QMi, QmI , QMI and Q . For any given program, numbers of seats and priority
structure of Qmi, QMi, QmI and QMI are determined by the current guideline and
are as we discussed in section 2. Since it is not possible to know actual demographic
backgrounds of students for the priority structure, both implementations we discussed
here takes claims of privileges as demographic backgrounds of students. For any given
set of contracts, the choice function used by UFMG, CUFMG(), works as the following:
Choice function lls seats in the following order: Qmi, QMi, QmI , QMI and
Q . For the priorities of the rst four group of seats choice function uses priorities
described by the current guideline and for the last group, Q , it gives priority to
contracts with privilege vector (0; 0; 0). If there are seats available in Q  choice
function gives priority
 to contracts with privilege vector (1; 1; 1), then
 to contracts with privilege vector (1; 0; 1), then
 to contracts with privilege vector (1; 1; 0), then
 to contracts with privilege vector (1; 0; 0)
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During this procedure, choice function either accepts all the contracts or lls
all the seats. In any case, choice function stops the procedure and rejects all the
remaining contracts, if there is any.
On the other hand, the choice function used by UFRGS, CUFRGS(), works as
the following:
Choice function lls seats in the following order: Q , QMI , QmI , QMi and
Qmi. For the priorities of the last four group of seats choice function uses priorities
described by the current guideline and for the rst group, Q , it accepts contracts one
at a time based on student scores starting with the contract of student with highest
score. During this procedure, choice function either accepts all the contracts or lls
all the seats. In any case, choice function stops the procedure and rejects all the
remaining contracts, if there is any.
Once we dene these two implementations of the BRCF guidelines, the bilat-
eral substitutes property of contracts directly comes from the second proposition of
Kominers and Sönmez (2012). Also, since there is only one possible contract for each
student to o¤er to a given program, the choice over contracts satises the substitutes
condition. Moreover, since each contract is acceptable to all slots, with a bigger con-
tract sets the set of contract chosen never shrinks. Therefore, CUFMG and CUFGRS
satisfy the Law of Aggregate Demand. Hence, if all programs use one of the imple-
mentations above, the existence of a stable allocation is guaranteed by Proposition 1
of Aygün and Sönmez (2013).
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Two Examples of the BRCF The two implementations of the guidelines designed by
the Brazilian government are instances of choice functions described in Westkamp
(2013) and Kominers and Sönmez (2012). Since these choice functions are designed
for a single contract for each student, like CMCF , contracts are not only bilateral
substitutes, a weak version of substitutes condition, as shown in Kominers and Sönmez
(2012) but also substitutes for each program. But these choice functions, unlike
CMCF , fail to satisfy the fairness and privilege monotonicity properties. They also
dont satisfy the a¢ rmative action objectives conditional on qp. We show, using
examples, how these choice functions violate these three conditions. We start with
privilege monotonicity.
Example 5 [Privilege Monotonicity] For a given program p let Qp = 8 , rmp =
1
2
and
let the set of contracts be Y = fx1; : : : ; x8g such that x1T = x2T = x3T = x4T = (0; 0; 0),
x5T = (1; 0; 0), x
6
T = (1; 1; 1), x
7
T = (1; 1; 0) and x
8
T = (1; 0; 1). Also let zp(x
i
S) >
zp(x
j
S) () i < j. Consider a low-income minority student from public high school
s =2 s(Y ) with score zp(s) > z(x8S). If she applies with a contract that includes all of
her privileges, i.e. (s; p; (1; 1; 1)), no matter which example of the BCRF program p
uses, she will be rejected:
(s; p; (1; 1; 1)) =2 Cp(Y [ f(s; p; (1; 1; 1))g) = fx1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6; x7; x8g
However, if she claims only low-income and public HS privileges, i.e. (s; p; (1; 0; 1)),
no matter which implementation of BRCF program p uses, her contract will be ac-
cepted:
(s; p; (1; 0; 1)) 2 Cp(Y [ f(s; p; (1; 0; 1))g) = fx1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6; x7; (s; p; (1; 0; 1))g
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Therefore, the two examples of the BRCF are not privilege monotonic.
The example above shows that since the choice function gives priority to stu-
dents who claim low-income and public HS only, the choice function gives student s
incentive not to claim her minority privilege. This problem can be solved by using
CMCF instead. CMCF gives students equal or higher chances to be chosen when their
contracts compete with others that has a subset of the privileges that she claims.
Hence students have no incentive not to claim privileges. The second example we
give regards the fairness property of choice functions.
Example 6 [Fairness] For a given program p let Qp = 8, rmp =
1
2
and let the set
of contracts be Y = fx1; : : : ; x9g such that x1T = x2T = x3T = x4T = (0; 0; 0), x5T =
x6T = (1; 1; 1), x
7
T = (1; 0; 1), x
8
T = (1; 1; 0) and x
9
T = (1; 0; 0). Also let zp(x
i
S) >
zp(x
j
S) () i < j. In this case, no matter which example of the BCRF program p
uses, the chosen set will be:
Cp(Y ) = fx1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x7; x8; x9g
Let x6S = j. Since student j can o¤er x
6, we can say that tj = (1; 1; 1) and (1; 0; 0) <
tj. Also, by assumption, she has higher score than owner of contract x9. Therefore,
rejecting x6 while accepting x9, violates fairness of the choice function.
In this second example, the program p chooses x9, although student j has
higher score and claims more privileges than privileges claimed in x9. This example
tells us that the guideline provided by the government implicitly tries to provide
diversity in the chosen students even when the law does not require it. On the
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other hand, CMCF only gives priority to students to which the a¢ rmative action is
addressed to. Therefore, CMCF prevents any fairness problems. The next example is
about the relationship between choice functions and the a¢ rmative action objectives.
Example 7 [A¢ rmative Action conditional on qp] For a given program p let Qp = 8,
rmp =
1
2
and let the set of contracts be Y = fx1; : : : ; x9g such that x1T = x2T = x3T =
x4T = (0; 0; 0), x
5
T = x
6
T = (1; 0; 0), x
7
T = x
8
T = (1; 1; 1) and x
9
T = (1; 0; 1). Also let
zp(x
i
S) > zp(x
j
S) () i < j. In both implementations of the BRCF guidelines, the
number of seats with priority for students who claim all the 3 privileges is 1 and one
seat accepts a contract with privilege vector (1; 0; 0) since there is no contract claiming
minority and public HS privileges only. If the set of contracts is Y , no matter which
example of the BRCF program p uses, the chosen set will be:
Cp(Y ) = fx1; x2; x3; x4; x5; x6; x7; x9g
Therefore, the choice function chooses only one student claiming minority and public
HS privileges, although it is possible to choose two, which is the number of seats with
priority for students claiming those privileges.
Another problem with the BRCF is that it considers students claiming public
HS privilege only as the rst order substitutes for students claiming minority and
public HS privileges only. Therefore, when there is an absence of applications from
contracts with privilege vector (1; 1; 0), the choice function turns to contracts with
privilege vector (1; 0; 0) and ignores the priority for minorities. In the example above,
one of the students claiming only public HS privilege receives the seat with priority
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for those claiming minority and public HS privileges. Hence, implementations of the
BRCF fail to satisfy the a¢ rmative action objectives conditional on qp.
Now, we will show that if programs adopt one of the implementations of BRCF
above, no matter what algorithm one chooses in order to create a stable mechanism,
the mechanism violates the properties we dened above. Previous papers have shown
us that some of the deciencies of choice functions can be corrected by choosing the
right algorithm. One example of this is the choice function used by the U.S. Mili-
tary Academy (USMA). Sönmez and Switzer (2013) have shown us that the USMA
priorities may fail to satisfy fairness, but than when they use the cumulative o¤er
algorithm the outcome of the mechanism is always fair. However, the following two
examples show that violations of incentive compatibility and fairness are carried by
any stable mechanism.
Example 8 [Incentive Compatibility] There is one program p with capacity of eight
seats and nine students S = fs1; : : : ; s9g. Let rmp = 12 and p be preferred to the null
contract by every student. The score order of students is given by zp(si) > zp(sj) ()
i < j. Also, vectors of privileges available to students are given by
ts1 = ts2 = ts3 = ts4 = (0; 0; 0)
ts5 = ts6 = (1; 1; 1)
ts7 = (1; 0; 0)
ts8 = (1; 1; 0)
ts9 = (1; 0; 1)
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For this problem, if every student claims all of the privileges that she is eligible to,
there is only one stable allocation, X 0, that we can achieve if program p uses one of the
implementations of the current BRCF. The set of students assigned is the following:
s(X 0) = fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s7; s8; s9g
Now, assuming that the other students use the same strategy as before, if s6 claims
only public HS privilege and submits (s6; p; (1; 0; 0)), there is again only one stable al-
location, say X 00, that we can achieve if the program p uses one of the implementations
of the current BRCF and the set of students assigned is the following:
s(X 00) = fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s8; s9g
Therefore, any stable mechanism with these two examples of the BRCF are not in-
centive compatible.
The example above shows that since these choice functions give priority to
students who claim a subset of the privileges that s6 is eligible to for some of the
seats available, they may give student s6 an incentive not to claim all of her privileges.
This not only puts a burden on students to gather more information about their peers
and strategize their behavior in order to get better assignments, but also gives some
students an unfair advantage in their college applications. Also, violation of incentive
compatibility causes an allocation to be chosen which is actually (with respect to
the groups to which the students belong to) unstable. It also makes it harder to
observe the e¤ect of this a¢ rmative action policy for future decisions over it. The
last example we give relates to the fairness property of mechanisms.
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Example 9 [Fairness] There are one program p with capacity of eight seats and nine
students S = fs1; : : : ; s9g. Let rmp = 12 and p be preferred to the null contract for each
student. The score order of students is given as zp(si) > zp(sj) () i < j. Also, the
vectors of privileges available to students are given by
ts1 = ts2 = ts3 = ts4 = (0; 0; 0)
ts5 = ts6 = (1; 1; 1)
ts7 = (1; 0; 0)
ts8 = (1; 1; 0)
ts9 = (1; 0; 1)
For this problem, if every student claims all the privileges that they are eligible to,
there is only one stable allocation, say X 0, that we can achieve if the program p uses
one of the implementations of the current BRCF and the set of students assigned is
the following:
s(X 0) = fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s7; s8; s9g
Since student s6 is eligible to claim all privileges and she has higher score than s7,s8
and s9, rejecting (s6; p; (1; 1; 1)) while accepting (s7; p; (1; 0; 0)), violates fairness. This
result holds no matter what kind of algorithm we use that gives stable allocation with
these two implementations of the BRCF.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a new market design application of university
program-student matching that emerged as result of the a¢ rmative action policy that
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was designed by the Brazilian government to aid minority and low-income students
from public high schools. This problem is particularly interesting in the sense that
the freedom of not claiming all of the privileges that a student is eligible to during the
application process combines the matching and the adverse selection problems. Due
to this fact, we dened the property of privilege monotonicity for choice functions for
the rst time in this literature.
This paper shows that the current guidelines for designing choice functions for
programs have avoidable deciencies, such as generating unfair allocations and giving
sophisticated students an advantage over others by manipulating the system.
We proposed a new choice function, denoted the multidimensional Brazil priv-
ileges choice function, that can also be used together with the student optimal sta-
ble mechanism to generate student assignments. The choice function is privilege
monotonic and fair unlike the current choice functions which are implementations of
the guidelines designed by the Brazilian government. Moreover, the mechanism we
suggest is incentive compatible, fair and yields a stable allocation for any problem.
With a complex privileges structure like we have in this problem, it is hard to
satisfy the a¢ rmative action objectives in all cases. We showed that the current choice
functions used by programs in Brazil not only fails to satisfy the a¢ rmative action
objectives when they are possible but also fails to satisfy a weaker condition that
imposes some restrictions over the population of students applying to a program. On
the other hand, the choice function we suggest always satises that weaker condition
and if the parameters for the choice function is selected correctly, the diversity targets
in the programs are reached by our procedure.
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3.8 Appendix
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 7] For any set of contracts Y and any phase i, let Yk
be set of contracts that is considered in phase k. Think about the procedure:
Phase 1. First observe that Y 01  Y 001 . If a contract x is not accepted in the
rst phase then either x =2 Y 01 or we have
jfy 2 Y 01 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj  qp:
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Therefore, either x =2 Y 001 , or Y 0  Y 00 implies
jfy 2 Y 001 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj  qp:
Hence contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the rst phase as well. So, we have
Y 02  Y 002 .
Phase 2. Let 0 and 00 be number of unused seats in Phase 1 when we use Y 0
and Y 00, respectively. As Y 01  Y 001 , we have 0  00. If a contract x is not accepted in
the second phase then either x =2 Y 02 which means x =2 Y 002 , or we have three cases
Case 1: If xT = (1; 1; 1), we have
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 0   qpg+
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
Qp
4
+ 0   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 0   2qp
Therefore, Y 02  Y 002 implies
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 00   qpg+
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
Qp
4
+ 00   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 00   2qp
as well. Hence, contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the second phase as well.
Case 2: If xT = (1; 1; 0), we have either
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+ 0   qp; or
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) s.t. yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
qc
4
+ 0   qg+
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 0   2qp.
105
Therefore, Y 02  Y 002 implies
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+ 00   qp; or
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
qc
4
+ 00   qg+
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 00   2qp
as well. Hence, contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the second phase as well.
Case 3: If xT = (1; 0; 1), we have either
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj 
qc
4
+ 0   q; or
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 0   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 0   2qp.
Therefore, Y 02  Y 002 implies
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj 
qc
4
+ 00   q; or
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 00   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(xS) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 00   2qp
as well. Hence, contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the second phase as well.
So any contract x that is not accepted from Y 0 in Phase 2, is not accepted from Y 00
in Phase 2. Moreover, that guarantees Y 03  Y 003 .
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Phase 3. Let 01 and 
00
1 be the number of unused seats in Phase 2 when we use
Y 0 and Y 00, respectively. As Y 02  Y 002 , we have 01  001. If a contract x is not accepted
in the third phase then either x =2 Y 03 which means x =2 Y 003 , or we have
jfy 2 Y 03 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
0
1.
Therefore, Y 03  Y 003 implies
jfy 2 Y 003 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
00
1
as well. Hence, contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the third phase as well.
So any contract x that is not accepted from Y 0 in Phase 3, is not accepted from Y 00
in Phase 3. Moreover, that guarantees Y 04  Y 004 .
Phase 4. Let 02 and 
00
2 be number of unused seats in Phase 3 when we use Y
0
and Y 00, respectively. As Y 03  Y 003 , we have 02  002. If a contract x is not accepted
in the fourht phase then we have
jfy 2 Y 04 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj 
Qp
2
+ 02.
Therefore, Y 04  Y 004 implies
jfy 2 Y 004 : zp(yS) > zp(xS)gj 
Qp
2
+ 002
as well. Hence, contract x can not be accepted from Y 00 in the last phase as well. So,
any contract x that is not accepted from Y 0 in Phase 4 is not accepted from Y 00 in
Phase 4.
A contract x is rejected in set Y 0 means that x must not be accepted in any
phase of the procedure. Above, we showed that for any phase if a contract is not
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accepted from Y 0, it can not be accepted from Y 00. Therefore, if a contract is rejected
from set Y 0 it must be rejected from set Y 00. Hence, contracts are substitutes for any
program.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 8] By construction of the choice function CMCF (),
all contracts of a given student can be rejected from a set only when school reaches
full capacity. Hence, the size of the chosen set can never shrink as the set of available
contracts grows.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 9] The choice function for any program p satises
the substitutes condition by Lemma 1 and satises the Law of Aggregate Demand
by Lemma 2. Hence, Lemma 3 is a corollary of Proposition 1 in Aygun and Sonmez
(2013)
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 8] To proof this proposition we use a parallel
problem where each student s has preference, tss , over contracts with ts and all other
contracts are unacceptable for s. The choice function for any program p satises the
substitutes condition by Lemma 1 and satises Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts by
Lemma 3. Therefore, as a corollary of Theorem 1 in Aygun and Sonmez (2013), there
is a stable allocation for a problem consists of (tss )s2S and (CMCFp ())p2P . Let one of
possible stable allocations for the parallel problem be X 0. We next show that X 0 is a
stable allocation for our original problem consists of (s)s2S and (CMCFp ())p2P .
Assume this is not true. Then there exists a student-program pair (s; p) and
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a contract x such that
x 2 X nX 0; xS = s and xP = p
x 2 Cp((X 0 nX 0s) [ fxg) and x s X 0s.
Due to privilege monotonicity property of CMCFp , we can nd a contract y such that
y 2 X nX 0; yS = s; yP = p and yT = ts
y 2 Cp((X 0 nX 0s) [ fyg) and y s X 0s
which contradicts with the stability of X 0 for the parallel problem. Hence, X 0 is a
stable allocation for original matching problem consists of (s)s2S and (CMCFp ())p2P .
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 9] Think about ve cases:
Case 1: Let ts = (1; 1; 1). Assume that her contract, x0, such that x0T = ts,
is rejected. Now, we are going to show that another contract of her, x, such that
xT < ts, must be rejected. For a given program p, let x0 = (s; p; ts) and x = (s; p; t0)
where t0 < ts and let Y 0 = Y [ fx0g and Y 00 = Y [ fxg. First, observe that if her
contract x0 is rejected from set Y 0, then her contract is not chosen in any phase.
Therefore, 0, 01 and 
0
2 are all zero since she is considered in all phases. Assume that
she o¤ers contract x instead of x0.
Phase 1: If t0 < (1; 1; 1) then x is not considered in the rst phase. Moreover,
since her contract x0 is rejected from set Y 0, there are at least qs contracts in Y with
the privilege vector (1,1,1). Therefore, 0 = 00 = 0 and = (Y 02 n fx0g)  Y 002 .
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Phase 2: Observe that if x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 0   qpg+
minfjfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
Qp
4
+ 0   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 02 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
  2qp
If t0 = (1; 1; 0), in the second phase we have either
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+ 00   qp or
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(j) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj;
Qp
4
+ 00   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
  2qp
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the second phase. If t0 = (1; 0; 1), in the
second phase we have either
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj 
Qp
4
+ 00   qp or
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 0; 1)gj+
minfjfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 0)gj; rmp
Qp
2
+ 00   qpg+
jfy 2 Y 002 : zp(yS) > zp(s) and yT = (1; 1; 1)gj  rmp
Qp
2
+
Qp
4
+ 00   2qp
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the second phase. If t0  (1; 1; 0) or t0  (1; 0; 1),
x will not be considered in the second phase, therefore it cannot be accepted in this
phase. Hence, no other available contract of student s can be chosen in this phase.
Also, 01 = 
00
1 = 0 and (Y
0
3 n fx0g)  Y 003 .
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Phase 3: Observe that if x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
jfy 2 Y 03 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp
If (1; 0; 0)  t0 < (1; 1; 1), in the third phase we have
jfy 2 Y 003 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the third phase. If t0  (1; 0; 0), x will not be
considered in the third phase, therefore it cannot be accepted in this phase. Hence,
no other available contract of student s can be chosen in this phase. Also 02 = 
00
2 = 0
and (Y 04 n fx0g)  Y 004 .
Phase 4: First, observe that if x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
jfy 2 Y 04 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
If t0 < (1; 1; 1), in the fourth phase we have
jfy 2 Y 004 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the fourth phase. Hence, no other available
contract of student s can be chosen.
Case 2: If ts = (1; 1; 0) and her contract x0 is rejected we can show that x is
not chosen in any phase.
Phase 1 and 2: If t0 < (1; 1; 0), then x is not considered in the rst two phases.
So, it can not be accepted in the these phases. Also 01 = 
00
1 and (Y
0
3 n fx0g)  Y 003 .
Phase 3: As contract x0 is rejected from set Y 0, we have
jfy 2 Y 03 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
0
1
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If t0  (1; 0; 0), then x is not considered in this phase, so it can not be accepted
in phase 3. If t0 = (1; 0; 0), then in the third phase we have
jfy 2 Y 003 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
00
1
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the third phase. Hence, no other available contract
of student s is chosen. Also 02 = 
00
2 and (Y
0
4 n fx0g)  Y 004 .
Phase 4: As contract x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
jfy 2 Y 04 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 02
If t0 < (1; 1; 0), in the fourth phase we have
jfy 2 Y 004 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 002
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the fourth phase. Hence, no other available
contract of student s is chosen.
Case 3: If ts = (1; 0; 1) and her contract x0 is rejected we can show that x is
not chosen in any phase.
Phase 1 and 2: If t0 < (1; 0; 1), then x is not considered in the rst two phases.
So, it can not be accepted in the these phases. Also 01 = 
00
1 and (Y
0
3 n fx0g)  Y 003 .
Phase 3: As contract x0 is rejected from set Y 0, we have
jfy 2 Y 03 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
0
1
If t0  (1; 0; 0), then x is not considered in this phase, so it can not be accepted
in phase 3. If t0 = (1; 0; 0), then in the third phase we have
jfy 2 Y 003 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj  (1  rmp )
Qp
2
  Qp
4
+ qp + 
00
1
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Therefore, x can not be accepted in the third phase. Hence, no other available contract
of student s is chosen. Also 02 = 
00
2 and (Y
0
4 n fx0g)  Y 004 .
Phase 4: As contract x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
jfy 2 Y 04 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 02
If t0 < (1; 0; 1), in the fourth phase we have
jfy 2 Y 004 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 002
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the fourth phase. Hence, no other available
contract of student s is chosen.
Case 4: If ts = (1; 0; 0) and her contract x0 is rejected we can show that x is
not chosen in any phase.
Phase 1,2 and 3: If t0 < (1; 0; 0), then x is not considered in the rst three
phases. So, it can not be accepted in the these phases. Also 02 = 
00
2 and (Y
0
4 nfx0g) 
Y 004 .
Phase 4: As contract x is rejected from set Y 0, then we have
jfy 2 Y 04 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 02
If t0 < (1; 0; 1), in the fourth phase we have
jfy 2 Y 004 : zp(yS) > zp(s)gj 
Qp
2
+ 002
Therefore, x can not be accepted in the fourth phase. Hence, no other available
contract of student s is chosen.
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Case 5: If ts  (1; 0; 0), then x, like x0, is only considered in the last phase
and can not be chosen since the set of other contracts considered in this phase are
identical for Y 0 and Y 00.
Therefore, (s; p; ts) =2 Y 0 guarantees (s; p; t0) =2 Y 00, for any t0 < ts. Hence,
Choice function is privilege monotonic.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 10] For any arbitrary set of contracts Y , owner
of any rejected contract x such that xT = (1; 1; 1), has lower score than owners of
chosen contracts. So, x =2 CMCFp (Y ) and xT = (1; 1; 1) =) 8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) >
zp(xS).
For any rejected contract x such that xT = (1; 0; 1), the only possible two types
of contracts that is chosen and with lower score than x are contracts with privilege
vector (1; 1; 1) or (1; 1; 0). But, since xT  (1; 1; 1), xT  (1; 1; 0) and owners of other
chosen contracts have higher scores than owner of x, we have x =2 CMCFp (Y ) and
xT = (1; 0; 1) =) 8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) > zp(xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
For any rejected contract x such that xT = (1; 1; 0), the only possible two types
of contracts that is chosen and with lower score than x are contracts with privilege
vector (1; 1; 1) or (1; 0; 1). But, since xT  (1; 1; 1), xT  (1; 0; 1) and owners of
other chosen contracts have higher score than owner of x, we have x =2 CMCFp (Y ) and
xT = (1; 1; 0) =) 8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) > zp(xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
For any rejected contract x such that xT = (1; 0; 0), the only possible types
of contracts that is chosen and with lower score than x are contracts with privilege
vector (1; 1; 1); (1; 1; 0) or (1; 0; 1). But, since xT  (1; 1; 1), xT  (1; 1; 0), xT 
(1; 0; 1) and owners of other chosen contracts have higher score than owner of x, we
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have x =2 CMCFp (Y ) and xT = (1; 0; 0) =) 8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) > zp(xS) or
xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
For any rejected contract such that xT  (1; 0; 0), owners of chosen contracts
with privilege vector greater than or equal to (1; 0; 0) may have lower score than
owner of x. Also, owners of other chosen contracts have higher score than owner of x.
Therefore, we have x =2 CMCFp (Y ) and xT = (1; 0; 0) =) 8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) >
zp(xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0). Hence for any type of contract, x =2 CMCFp (Y ) =)
8y 2 CMCFp (Y ); zp(yS) > zp(xS) or xT  yT  (1; 0; 0).
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 11] For a given program p and given set of
contracts Y , let
jfx 2 Y : xT = (1; 1; 1)gj  qp:
In the rst phase qp contracts with privilege vector xT = (1; 1; 1) will be
accepted. In the second phase, a contract will be accepted whenever it is in top
rmp Qp
2
  qp among contracts claiming minority and public HS privilege, i.e. xT 
(1; 1; 0), in Y2. Therefore, in the second phase at least
rmp Qp
2
  qp and in total at
least
rmp Qp
2
contracts with xT  (1; 1; 0) will be accepted, otherwise all contracts with
xT  (1; 1; 0) will be accepted. Hence,
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 1; 0)gj  minf
rmp Qp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 1; 0)gjg.
will be satised.
Next, consider contracts with xT  (1; 0; 1). In the rst phase qp contracts
with privilege vector xT = (1; 1; 1) will be accepted. In the second phase, a contract
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will be accepted whenever it is in top Qp
4
  qp among contracts claiming low-income
and public HS privilege, i.e. xT  (1; 0; 1), in Y2. Therefore, in the second phase at
least Qp
4
  qp and in total at least Qp4 contracts with xT  (1; 0; 1) will be accepted,
otherwise all contracts with xT  (1; 0; 1) will be accepted. Hence,
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 1)gj  minfQp
4
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 1)gjg:
will be satised.
Finally, consider contracts with xT  (1; 0; 0). In the rst two phases r
m
p Qp
2
+
Qp
4
  qp   01 contracts with with privilege vector xT > (1; 0; 0), will be accepted. In
the third phase, all the contracts with xT = (1; 0; 0) and all the tentatively rejected
contracts in phase 2 are considered. In this phase, a contract will be accepted when-
ever it is in top Qp
4
  rmp Qp
2
+ qp among contracts with xT  (1; 0; 0) in Y3. Therefore,
in the third phase at least Qp
4
  rmp Qp
2
+ qp and in total at least
Qp
2
contracts with
xT  (1; 0; 0) will be accepted, otherwise all contracts with xT  (1; 0; 0) will be
accepted. Hence,
jfx 2 Cp(Y ) : xT  (1; 0; 0)gj  minfQp
2
; jfx 2 Y : xT  (1; 0; 0)gjg:
will be satised.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 12] The contracts are substitutes for any program
p by Lemma 1 and choice functions satisfy IRC condition by Lemma 3. Therefore, as
a corollary of Theorem 3 in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) and Theorem 1 in Aygun
and Sonmez (2013), SOSM produces a stable allocation for student preferences for a
problem consists of (tss )s2S and (CMCFp ())p2P . Moreover, as we showed in the proof
of Proposition 1, the stable allocation SOSM produces is also stable for the original
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problem consists of (tss )s2S and (CMCFp ())p2P . Hence, for any problem, the outcome
of SOSM is stable.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 13] Assume that is not true. So, we can nd
x; y 2 X 0 such that yP xS xP , zyP (yS) < zyP (xS) and xT > yT . Since we have
yP xS xP , there exist a contract x0 such that x0 = (xS; yP ; txS) and x0 xS x. By
the design of cumulative o¤er algorithm, x0 must be o¤ered by xS and be rejected
before the nal step K. Therefore, at step K, we have y; x0 2 AyP (K) and X 0yP =
CMCFyP (AyP (K)). Since contracts are substitutes for each program and x
0 is rejected
before the nal step K, x0 =2 CMCFyP (AyP (K)) must be true. By fairness condition of
choice function
x0 =2 CMCFyP (AyP (K)) =) zyP (yS) > zyP (x0S) or xT  yT
a contradiction. Hence  SOSM , is fair.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 14] For an arbitrary student s, assume that
0 = (t0;0s) 6= (ts;s). Let her assigned program from  SOSM(0;  s) be p. Also,
let 00 be a strategy with privilege vector t0 and preference with only contract (s; p; t0)
is acceptable. Since choice functions satises substitutes condition by Lemma 1
and Law of Aggregate Demand by Lemma 2, student s gets same assignment from
 SOSM(00;  s). This part is a corollary of Theorem 10 in Hateld and Milgrom
(2005).
Now, let 000 be a strategy with privilege vector ts and preference with only
(s; p; ts) is acceptable. Due to privilege monotonicity of choice functions, her assign-
ment from  SOSM(000;  s) must be (s; p; ts).
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Finally, since for any given type prole choice function satises substitutes
condition by Lemma 1 and Law of Aggregate Demand by Lemma 2, we know that
students can not manipulate student optimal stable mechanism by submitting dif-
ferent preferences, i.e.  SOSM((ts;s);  s) s  SOSM(000;  s), by Theorem 11 in
Hateld and Milgrom (2005). So we have;
 SOSM((ts;s);  s) s  SOSM(000;  s) s  SOSM(00;  s) s  SOSM(0;  s)
Therefore for any 0,
 SOSM(0;  s) s  SOSM((ts;s);  s)
Hence  SOSM is incentive compatible.
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